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The Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade, and Development 
Poliq for Sub-Saharan Africa: Sowing the Seeds of False 
Hope for Sub-Saharan Africa's Cotton Farmers? 
Kevin C. Kennedy* 
Five developments in 2004 could be significant for sub-Saharan Africa, 
including cotton farmers in the region. In chronological order, first, on January 23, 
2004, President Bush signed into law the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003,1 
providing development assistance to the world's poorest countries that rule justly, 
invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom.2 Second, in July 2004, 
Congress enacted legislation reauthorizing the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(known as the AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004 or "AGOA III"), and extending its 
benefits for certain textile and clothing imports from sub-Saharan Africa through 2007, 
with an overall extension of the Act until 2015.3 Third, at the end of July 2004 the 
WTO members concluded a framework agreement on agricultural negotiations that is 
part of the Doha Development Agenda that includes a crop-specific commitment to 
reduce cotton subsidies and gives special consideration to cotton growers in 
developing countries.4 Fourth, on September 8, 2004, a WTO panel in United States-
Subsidies on Upland Cotton, found certain government subsidies provided to U.S. 
cotton growers to be in violation of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.5 Fifth, at the end of 2004 the 
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing will be fully implemented, thus ending all 
GATT-inconsistent import quotas on textiles and clothing, and opening this sector to 
regular GAIT disciplines for the first time in several decades. 6 
My paper considers the implications of these five developments for cotton 
farmers and the clothing industry in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) and asks whether their 
collective impact will be positive, negative, or neutral. The overarching theme of my 
paper is what I consider to be the lack of overall coherence in U.S. agricultural, trade, 
and development policies when it comes to sub-Saharan Africa, as evidenced by trade 
and development programs aimed at improving the lives of people in sub-Saharan 
Africa, on the one hand, and U.S. subsidies to American cotton producers and the 
injurious impact those subsidies have had on cotton growers in sub-Saharan Africa, on 
the other. My paper also explores three interrelated sub-themes. 
The first sub-theme considers the impact that the termination of the Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) at the end of 2004 will have on SSA suppliers of 
cotton to regional manufacturers of cotton textiles and clothing. The second sub-theme 
is the role, if any, that the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the 
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Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (MCA) will play in softening the impact on sub-
Saharan Africa of the termination of the ATC. To what extent are export markets for 
SSA manufactured clothing under threat from China and India, the two countries 
projected to dominate the global textile and clothing market following ATC 
termination? What will be the upstream impact of ATC termination on SSA cotton 
producers? Are AGOA and the MCA a case of too little, too late? 
The third sub-theme is the impact that subsidies to cotton growers in China, the 
European Union, and the United States - especially in the United States, the world's 
largest exporter of cotton - will have on cotton growers in sub-Saharan Africa, in 
particular in West and Central Africa. Much attention recently has been devoted to the 
issue of agricultural subsidies, both in the on-going Doha Development Round 
negotiations 7 and in recent WTO dispute settlement proceedings.8 In that connection, a 
joint proposal was submitted by the four West and Central African nations of Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali at the 2003 WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, 
Mexico, proposing that all subsidies on cotton be eliminated immediately because such 
subsidies injure developing countries that are dependent upon cotton for income and 
livelihoods. That joint proposal and its aftermath are discussed below. 
My paper is divided into four parts. In Part I, I discuss the critical role that 
agriculture, in particular cotton production, plays in the economies of certain least-
developed countries, the majority of which are located in sub-Saharan Africa. I 
discuss the role that cotton plays in income generation and poverty reduction in the 
SSA region, its importance to the lives of the people living in West and Central Africa, 
and the future of the cotton sector in sub-Saharan Africa. Part I further analyzes the 
impact that agricultural subsidies in other parts of the world, especially in the United 
States, have had on cotton growers in sub-Saharan Africa. Part I concludes with an 
analysis of the joint proposal launched by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali in 
2003 to eliminate such subsidies. 
In Part IT, I analyze the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and the projected 
impact its termination at the end of 2004 will have on the global production of textiles 
and clothing, with a focus on the impact that the Agreement's termination will have on 
producers of upstream inputs such as cotton. Part ill begins with a review of U.S. 
trade and development policy for sub-Saharan Africa, including AGOA and the MCA. 
It then turns to an examination of the interplay of AGOA and the termination of the 
ATC and their combined impact on SSA cotton producers. In Part IV, I focus on two 
issues: (1) whether U.S. trade and development policy for the SSA region has 
overemphasized promotion of textiles and clothing without taking adequate account of 
the impact on the region of the ATC's termination, and (2) whether subsidies to U.S. 
cotton producers and U.S. domestic agricultural policy is working at cross-purposes 
with its international trade and development policy for the SSA region. In Part IV, I 
308 
HeinOnline -- 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 309 2004-2005
Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade, and Development Policy 
offer suggestions for correcting what I view to be a lack of coordination in U.S. 
agricultural, trade, and development policies for sub-Saharan Africa. 
I. THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA'S ECONOMY 
By way of a backdrop, the WTO divides its membership into three groups: 
developed countries, developing countries, and least-developed countries. The 
difference between a developed country and a developing country traditionally has 
been a matter of self-selection. lO Regarding designation as a least-developed country 
(LDC) , Article XI:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization accepts the United Nations' designation of a country as least developed 
for purposes of the WTO agreements. I I As of 2004, the United Nations recognized the 
following 50 countries as being least developed: 12 
Afghanistan Lesotho 
Angola Liberia Zambia 
Bangladesh Madagascar 
Benin Malawi 
Bhutan Mauritania 
Burkina Faso 
Burma Nepal 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cape Verde 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Comoros 
Djibouti 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea Sudan 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Kiribati 
Laos 
Maldives 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
Tanzania 
Timor Leste 
Togo 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Vanuatu 
Yemen 
Zaire 
Thirty-two of the 50 LDCs are WTO Members. I3 Of the 18 LDCs that have 
not yet joined the WTO, ten (Bhutan, Cape Verde, Equatoriill Guinea, Ethiopia, Laos, 
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Samoa, Sao Tome & Principe, Sudan, Vanuatu, and Yemen) have observer status at 
the WTO, the first step toward WTO accession. 14 The remaining eight -- Afghanistan, 
Comoros, Eritrea, Kiribati, Liberia, Somalia, Timor Leste, and Tuvalu -- are not 
currently in the process of acceding to the WTO. 15 Thirty~five of the 50 LDCs are 
located in sub-Saharan Africa, meaning that only 13 of the 48 countries that make up 
sub-Saharan Africa are not classified as LDCs. 16 All but nine of the SSA LDCs are 
WTO members. 17 
Farming dominates the economies of virtually every LDC. As shown in Table 
1, the role that farming plays in the work force and the overall economies of the LDCs 
in sub-Saharan Africa is significant: 
TABLE 1. THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN SSA ECONOMIES 
Percentage of Labor Percentage of GDP 
Sub-Saharan LDCs Force Employed in Attributable to 
Agriculture in 2002 Agriculture in 2002 
Angola 71 8 
Benin 52 35 
Burkina Faso 92 38 
Burundi 90 49 
Cape Verde 22 11 
Central African Republic 71 55 
Chad 73 37 
Comoros 73 35 
Democratic Rep. of the 62 56 
Congo 
Djibouti 78 4 
Equatorial Guinea 69 8 
Eritrea 77 21 
Ethiopia 82 52 
Gambia ·78 40 
Guinea 83 24 
Guinea-Bissau 82 58 
Lesotho 39 18 
Liberia 67 (data unavailable) 
Madagascar 73 27 
Malawi 82 39 
Mali 80 46 
Mauritania 52 21 
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Mozambique 81 23 
Niger 87 40 
Rwanda 90 42 
Senegal 73 18 
Sierra Leone 61 52 
Sao Tome & Principe 63 20 
Somalia 70 (data unavailable) 
Sudan 59 39 
Togo 59 40 
Uganda 79 31 
United Republic of 80 45 
Tanzania 
Zambia 68 22 
All LDCs 69 33 
All Developing Countries 54 12 
Source. UNCTAD LDC REpORT 2004 II! 
With the exceptions of Cape Verde and Lesotho, agriculture employs at a minimum 
more than 50 percent of the labor force in all SSA LDCs. In the case of seven SSA 
LDCs (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Sao Tome & Principe, Somalia, and Zambia), agriculture employs more than 
60 percent of the labor force; in the case of 11 SSA LDCs (Angola, the Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Mali, Senegal, Uganda, and the 
United Republic of Tanzania), more than 70 percent of the work force is employed in 
agriculture; in eight other SSA LDCs (Burundi, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda), the figure is more than 80 percent; and in 
Burkina Faso, more than 92 percent of the labor force works in agriculture. The 
economic dependency of these nations on agriculture is equally striking: Twenty-
seven of them are ranked among the top 48 countries in terms of economic dependency 
on agriculture as a percentage of GDP. 19 
One of the most important crops grown in sub-Saharan Africa is cotton. The 
part that cotton plays in the farming activities of SSA LDCs is explored next. 
A. The Importance of Cotton to SSA Farmers and the SSA Textile and Clothing 
Industry 
As a percentage of total world merchandise trade, raw cotton's share is 
miniscule (approximately one-tenth of one percent20). Nevertheless, cotton is one of 
311 
HeinOnline -- 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 312 2004-2005
Kennedy 
the most important textile fibers in the world, accounting for over 40 fercent of total 
world fiber production (down, however, from 68 percent in 1960), 1 but has lost 
market share from man-made fibers that account for almost 57 percent of total world 
fiber consumption.22 While some 80 countries produce cotton, the world's four largest 
producing and consuming countries are China, the United States, India, and Pakistan, 
with the United States, China, and India together providing over half the world's 
cotton.23 The United States, which ranks second to China in cotton production, is the 
world's leading cotton exporter, accounting for over one-third of global trade in raw 
cotton.24 
Tables 2 and 4 below identify the world's ten largest producers of cotton and 
their respective volume of cotton imports and exports for the 2003/04 marketing year 
and the forecast for the 2004/05 marketing year, respectively, followed by Tables 3 
and 5 that list the ten largest producers of cotton in sub-Saharan Africa, together with 
their respective volumes of cotton imports and exports for the 2003/04 marketing year 
and the forecast for the 2004/05 marketing year, respectively. 
TABLE 2. COTTON PRODUCTION, IMPORTS, AND EXPORTS FOR 2003/04 MARKETING 
YEAR 
Wid' T 10Pr d k d f d f n) or s op o ucers In ran or er 0 pro uc 10 
Country Production Imports Exports 
(1,000 Metric 
Tons) 
China 4,855 1,916 38 
United 3,975 11 . 3,005 
States 
India 2,874 196 120 
Pakistan 1,687 381 33 
Brazil 1,263 103 196 
Uzbekistan 914 1 680 
Turkey 893 479 87 
Australia 327 0 468 
Greece 333 4 255 
Syria 283 0 152 
Source: U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service25 
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TABLE 3. COTTON PRODUCTION, IMPORTS, AND EXPORTS FOR 2003/04 MARKETING 
YEAR 
Sub-Sah aran AC· 'T T Prd r nca s op en o ucers 10 ran k d f Pr duction) or ero 0 
Country Production Imports Exports 
(1,000 Metric 
Tons) 
Mali 261 0 256 
Burkina 210 0 207 
Faso 
Benin 149 0 158 
Zimbabwe 100 0 71 
Cameroon 109 0 103 
Cote 87 0 109 
d'Ivoire 
Sudan 76 0 82 
Togo 71 0 67 
Tanzania 51 0 44 
Chad 49 0 54 
Source: U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service26 
TABLE 4. COTTON PRODUCTION, IMpORTS, AND EXPORTS FOR 2004/05 MARKETING 
YEAR FORECAST 
Wid' T 10Pr d r or s op o ucers 10 ran k d f d t· n) or er 0 pro uc 10 
Country Production Imports Exports 
(1,000 Metric 
Tons) 
China 6,532 1,252 44 
United 3,919 9 2,460 
States 
India 2,722 261 22 
Pakistan 1,905 327 44 
Brazil 1,415 109 435 
Uzbekistan 1,002 0 675 
Turkey 925 474 50 
Australia 523 0 457 
Greece 337 4 196 
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Syria I 294 I 0 I 152 I 
Source: U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service27 
TABLE 5. COTTON PRODUCTION, IMPORTS, AND EXPORTS FOR 2004/05 MARKETING 
YEAR FORECAST 
Sub-Sah aran Af' , T T Pr d rIca s op en o ucers 10 ran k d f or er 0 pro duction) 
Country Production Imports Exports 
(1,000 Metric 
Tons) 
Mali 233 0 223 
Burkina 200 0 196 
Faso 
Benin 147 0 142 
Cote 114 0 109 
d'Ivoire 
Zimbabwe 109 0 76 
Cameroon 105 0 93 
Sudan 87 0 71 
Togo 72 0 67 
Tanzania 71 0 49 
Chad 70 0 60 
Source: U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service28 
In the West and Central African (WCA) countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Chad, Mali, and Togo, cotton production accounts for 5 to 10 percent of gross 
domestic product.29 These WCA countries' exports are dominated by cotton, which 
represents approximately 30 to 40 percent of total export earnings and over 60 percent 
of earnings from agricultural exports.30 Since the early 1980s, cotton production in the 
WCA countries has increased fivefold, from 200,000 tons to almost one million tons, 
employing some 10 million people.31 As a comparison of Tables 4 and 5 reveals, the 
WCA countries combined are the seventh largest global producer of cotton after China, 
the United States, India, Pakistan, Brazil, and Uzbekistan. With approximately a 15-
percent share of global exports, the WCA countries collectively are the second largest 
exporter after the United States.32 In addition, by international standards, the WCA 
countries produce high-quality cotton with production costs among the lowest in the 
world, clearly lower than those of the United States and the European Union (in fact, 
the two EU cotton producers, Spain and Greece, are the world's highest cost 
producers).33 
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Moreover, measured by total production over the ten-year period 1991-2000, 
the top five LDC growers of raw cotton - all located in sub-Saharan Africa - were 
Mali (also the largest cotton exporter in terms of value of exports among the least 
developed countries), ~enin, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and Chad.34 However, when 
measured as a share of cotton exports to total exports, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Chad 
are more dependent on cotton exports than either Sudan or Mali. As noted by 
UNCTAD, "[i]n 1999-2001, cotton exports of Benin, Burkina Faso, and Chad 
accounted for a larger share of their total merchandise exports (between 60.3 and 77.9 
percent) and a large share of their GDP (between 5.0 and 9.4 per cent).,,35 
Unfortunately, SSA cotton growers have to contend with the artificially low 
prices fetched for cotton on world markets as a result of being forced to compete with 
subsidized cotton in those markets.36 Cotton subsidies provided by both developed and 
developing countries37 have had important negative effects that are transmitted through 
a decline in cotton prices on world markets?8 Cotton subsidies, especially those 
bestowed by the United States upon its cotton farmers, have had at the least a price 
suppressing effect on world prices for cotton,39 to the detriment of cotton farmers in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Some estimates put the amount of subsidies that U.S. cotton 
growers received in 2001-2002 at $3.9 billion in combined domestic and export 
subsidies40 and $3.7 billion in 2002-2003.41 The impact of those subsidies on world 
cotton prices has been ,galpable. The adjusted world price for cotton in mid-2004 was 
nearly $.56 per pound, 2 the highest it has been in seven seasons, but still down from 
its 1994-1995 high of over $.76 per pound.43 Cotton growers in Benin, Burkina Faso, 
and Mali increased the quantity of their cotton exports between 1994-1995 and 2001-
2002, but saw their export earnings from cotton decline even as the quantities of their 
cotton exports increased during the same seven-year period.44 In fact, "[o]ver 90 
percent of the cotton produced in the WCA countries is for export.,,45 From 1999 to 
2002, their production increased by 14 percent, but their export earnings fell by 31 
percent. 46 
Although cotton plays only a minor role in the economic activities of 
industrialized countries, it is of vital importance in many WCA countries. Over 10 
million people in the region depend directly on cotton production,47 making it 
"possible to improve the physical and social infrastructure in cotton-producing 
regions," including roads, schools, and health centers.48 As noted in the Joint Proposal, 
"[t]he expansion of cotton production is also responsible for the improvement of health 
in the cotton-growing regions.,,49 Moreover, "surveys of households in Benin, Burkina 
Faso, and Mali show that poverty levels fell more quickly in areas where cotton 
production had developed" compared to other areas. 50 Cotton therefore occupies a 
strategic position in the development policies and poverty reduction programs of the 
WCA countries. 
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From the standpoint of comparative advantage, does either sub-Saharan Africa 
or the United States have any business growing cotton? According to a World Bank 
paper published in 2002,51 cotton is "an economically viable crop" in West and Central 
Africa "that has had a significant and positive impact on exports, economic growth, 
and rural development.,,52 The region produces high-quality cotton·and high average 
crop yields by international standards,5 and does so using farming techniques that are 
labor intensive (in contrast to mechanized cotton farming in the United States) and on 
small, one-to-three acre farms.54 A survey of cotton producer costs conducted in 2001-
2002 in 28 countries (including four WCA countries) reveals that WCA countries were 
among the world's lowest cost producers. 55 As noted in a World Bank research paper, 
"Few other countries can produce cotton profitably at this price level.,,56 Not only can 
they produce cotton cheaply, but cotton is also rriore profitable than other crops in the 
WCA region. And while cotton growers in the United States, Australia, and Brazil can 
shift production from cotton to soybeans, WCA producers do not enjoy the same 
flexibility regarding crop substitution.57 
To add market forces insult to SSA economic injury, the United States is not a 
low-cost producer of cotton. Statistics from the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
estimate that the average cost of producing a pound of raw cotton in the United States 
is $.73 per pound.58 This figure compares to an average cost of production in Burkina 
Faso of $.21 per pound. 59 Yet, even though U.S. production costs are higher, with the 
help of domestic and export subsidies, u.S. cotton growers - the world's largest 
exporters of cotton - suppress and depress the price of cotton on world markets by 
increasing its supply through overproduction.6o . All of this is made possible, of course, 
through U.S. farm legislation, the current law being the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002. 
The font of U.S. cotton subsidies is the Farm Security and Rural Investment 
Act of 2002 ("the 2002 Farm Act"). The 2002 Farm Act establishes an interrelated 
payment system to cotton farmers in the form of direct payments, countercyclical 
payments, and guaranteed commodity loan rates.61 The payment rate for direct 
payments is fixed and not affected by current production or by current market prices. 
Direct payments to farmers are based on historical acreage and on historical yields. 
Under the direct payment program, eligible producers receive an annual payment that 
is equal to the product of the national payment rate of the applicable crop, the 
producer's payment acres (85 fercent of base acres) for that crop, and the producer's 
payment yield for the crop.6 In addition, producers must use the land for an 
agricultural or conservation use and not for a non-agricultural commercial or industrial 
use and abide by conservation compliance requirements.63 
The United States maintains that direct payments are decoupled income support 
and thus fall into the "green box" category of subsidies established under the WTO 
316 
HeinOnline -- 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 317 2004-2005
Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade, and Development Policy 
Agreement on Agriculture (green box subsidies are exempt from the subsidy reduction 
and ceiling commitments made under the Agreement on Agriculture). In 2004, the 
WTO panel, in United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, rejected this classification 
because receipt of direct payments is conditioned upon certain planting flexibility 
limitations and, thus, could not qualify as being "decoupled" from production, a 
prerequisite for being placed in the green box category of exempt subsidies.64 By 
default, direct payments therefore fall into the "amber box" of agricultural subsidies 
that are subject to a cap of $19.1 billion in the case of the United States.65 
The 2002 Farm Act also establishes a new program of countercyclical 
payments (CCP) that provide price-dependent benefits for covered commodities 
whenever the effective price for the commodity is less than its target price. Payments 
are based on historical areas and yields and are not tied to current production of the 
covered commodity (this feature is what makes the payments "countercyclical"). The 
2002 Farm Act establishes a target (or minimum) lrice for each covered crop, which in 
the case of upland cotton is 72.4 cents per pound, or $1.56 per kilogram (much higher 
than the average world price for cotton in 2001 and 2002 of $1.06 and $1.00 per 
kilogram, respectively67). When the higher of the loan rate or the season average price 
plus the direct payment rate is below the target price, a CCP is made at a rate equal to 
that difference. To illustrate with a simplified example, as noted the target price for 
upland cotton is 72.4 cents per pound, the direct payment rate is 6.67 cents per pound, 
and the loan rate is 52 cents per pound (the actual amount being paid in 200468). 
Assuming that the season average price for cotton is 53 cents per pound (an amount 
greater than the 52 cent loan rate), then a CCP payment of 12.73 cents per pound 
would be made (the 72.4 cent target price less (1) 53 cents and (2) the 6.67 cent direct 
payment rate). 69 
A third feature of the 2002 Farm Act is the commodity loan program that 
allows producers of designated crops, including cotton, to receive a loan from the U.S. 
Government at a commodity-specific loan rate per unit of production by pledging crop 
production as loan collateral. After harvest, a farmer may obtain a loan for all or part of 
the new commodity production. Commodity loans may be settled in three ways: (1) 
repaying the loan at the loan rate plus interest costs, (2) repaying the loan at a lower 
loan repayment rate, if applicable, or (3) forfeiting the crop pledged as loan collateral 
at loan maturity. Thus, what amounts to a minimum guaranteed price of 52 cents per 
pound has been set for upland cotton. This 52-cent guaranteed price is independent of 
the world price.70 
In addition to these three key domestic subsidies provided under the 2002 Farm 
Act, on the export subsidy side of the ledger the Act also establishes the Export Credit 
Guarantee Program and the so-called "Step 2" program. The "Step 2" program is a 
special marketing loan provision for upland cotton.71 "Step 2" payments eliminate any 
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price difference for cotton between the U.S. internal price and the world price when 
U.S. exporters sell cotton abroad or when domestic mills purchase cotton.72 The 
program provides cash payments to eligible domestic users and exporters of upland 
cotton when certain market conditions exist such that U.S. cotton pricing benchmarks 
are exceeded.73 The Step 2 payment scheme in essence keeps the domestic price for 
cotton competitive with the international price, thereby eliminating price as a 
consideration when domestic users of cotton inputs (such as textile mills) are deciding 
whether to source cotton domestically or overseas, and thus keeping local firms that 
export U.S.-grown cotton price competitive on world markets.74 The WTO panel in 
Upland Cotton found both features of the Step 2 program to be a prohibited import 
substitution subsidy and a prohibited export subsidy, respectively.75 
Under the Export Credit Guarantee Program, the short-term credit program 
(credit extended for up to three years) and the intermediate-term credit program (credit 
extended for up to seven years) guarantee repayment of credit extended by U.S. 
financial institutions to eligible foreign banks that issue letters of credit in connection 
with sales of U.S. agricultural commodities, including cotton.76 In essence, foreign 
importers of U.S. cotton exports can borrow dollars to purchase U.S. cotton exports, 
with repayment of the loan being guaranteed by the U.S. government. This program, 
which the WTO panel in Upland Cotton found to be a prohibited export subsidy, gives 
U.S. cotton exporters a clear advantage over exporters in developing countries where 
no comparable lending facility exists.77 
Lest it be thought that Congress was in an uncommonly generous mood when it 
passed the 2002 Farm Act, the 2002 Farm Act did not usher in a whole new legal 
regime of government largesse for U.S. cotton growers. On the contrary, prior farm 
legislation in the United States was equally supportive. It is estimated that U.S. 
government assistance to cotton producers was $878 million in 1996-1997, $1.24 
billion in 1997-1998, $1.87 billion in 1998-1999, $3.49 billion in 1999-2000, $2.22 
billion in 2000-2001, and $3.6 billion in 2001-2002.78 It is further estimated that U.S. 
cotton producers received $3.9 billion in subsidies in 2001-2002 to produce a cotton 
crop valued at $3 billion at world prices.79 In other words, there was a net cost to the 
U.S. economy of at least $0.6 billion to grow cotton. As noted by one commentator, "If 
cotton prices remain at their 2001-2002 levels, then US support to its cotton sector is 
expected to be on the order of $3.5 to $4.0 billion for the next six years, implying the 
US cotton producers will be receiving close to twice the world market price."so 
Subsidies that are tied to the price of a commodity (e.g., countercyclical payments) 
encourage production, which in tum encourage overproduction even when market 
forces are signaling that production should be decreased. By encouraging 
overproduction, these subsidies prevent the price of cotton on world markets from 
naturally rising as they would in a market of steady demand and declining supplies. 
318 
HeinOnline -- 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 319 2004-2005
Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade, and Development Policy 
Couple this situation with the fact that the United States is the world's leading cotton 
exporter, and the stage is set for price suppression in world cotton markets. 
In 2001-2002, each acre of land under cotton cultivation in the United States 
received approximately $230 in subsidies compared with less than $50 per acre for 
soybeans, com, and wheat.8l In the United States, cotton is clearly king.82 This $230 
per acre in subsidies is especially striking when compared to the 2002 per capita GDP 
of SSA cotton producers such as Burkina Faso ($225), Chad ($232), and Mali ($251).83 
The costs of U.S. cotton subsidies to sub-Saharan Africa .in terms of lost foreign-
exchange earnings from the sale of cotton is substantial, exceeding the amount of 
foreign aid those countries received under programs administered by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development. 84 
The United States accounted for almost half of the direct domestic support 
received by cotton producers around the world ($2.3 billion in 2001-2002), with China 
accounting for approximately $1.2 billion in 2001-2002, and the European Union 
accounting for $700 million during that same period.85 As noted in the 2003 Joint 
Proposal submitted by the WCA countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali to 
the WTO, the contrasts could not be more striking: 
The subsidies given to American cotton producers are 60 per cent more 
than the total GDP of Burkina Faso, where over 2 million people 
depend on cotton production. One half of cotton subsidies to American 
producers (around US$1 billion) goes to a few thousand farmers who 
cultivate around 1,000 acres of cotton and are thus well above the 
poverty threshold. In the WCA countries, on the other hand, these 
subsidies penalize one million farmers who only have five acres of 
cotton and live on less than US$1 per person per day.86 
By one estimate, the removal of U.S. cotton subsidies would cause a decline in U.S. 
production that would in tum have led to an increase in the international price of cotton 
by as much as 12 cents per pound in 2000-2001.87 That figure would have jumped to 
22 cents per pound in 2001-2002.88 If subsidies worldwide were eliminated, an even 
more positive effect would have resulted, with ~rices rising to 17 cents per pound for 
2000/01 and 31 cents per pound for 2001-2002. 9 Even accounting for the depressing 
effect that price increases would have on supply and demand, cotton from WCA 
countries would be highly profitable in such a subsidies-free market. 9o 
In sum, the negative effects of cotton subsidies are particularly significant for 
those least-developed countries that have the strongest specialization in cotton 
production. On the basis of the assumption that cotton prices per pound in 2001 would 
have been 12 cents higher if the United States had eliminated cotton subsidies, it has 
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been estimated that West and Central African countries lost foreign exchange earnings 
of $250 billion.91 Trade potential exercises show that if full liberalization in the cotton 
sector were to take place, "including removal of both trade barriers and production 
support (along with liberalization in all other commodity sectors), cotton prices would 
rise above the price that would have prevailed in the absence of reforms.,,92 
B. The Cotton Initiative 
At the WTO's Fourth Ministerial Conference held at Doha, Qatar in 2001, the 
WTO members launched what has been styled the Doha Development "Agenda".93 In 
connection with negotiations on trade in agriculture, paragraph 13 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration provides in part as follows: 
Building on the work carried out to date and without prejudging the 
outcome of the negotiations we commit ourselves to comprehensive 
negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in market access; 
reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; 
and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.94 
Despite the Ministerial Conference's charge to the membership, the WTO members 
made no progress during the two years leading up to the WTO's Fifth Ministerial 
Conference in 2003.95 In the final months before the WTO's Fifth Ministerial 
Conference at Cancun, Mexico in September 2003, the four West and Central African 
nations of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali submitted a joint proposal to the WTO 
Committee on Agriculture entitled, Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of 
Cotton.96 Their proposal, commonly known as the Cotton Initiative, was presented on 
June 10, 2003 to the WTO Trade Negotiations Committee by the President of Burkina 
Faso, Blaise Compaore.97 The Cotton Initiative notes the internal market reforms that 
WCA countries have undertaken in order to make their respective cotton sectors more 
globally competitive, but that these reforms had been "virtually nullified" by the 
subsidies given by other WTO members to cotton farmers.98 The Cotton Initiative 
proponents also assert that if these domestic and export subsidies were eliminated, 
"cotton production in WCA countries would be highly profitable and could act as an 
important catalyst for poverty reduction in the countries concerned.,,99 
Against this backdrop -- and because the elimination of cotton subsidies is the 
only item of interest to these four WCA countries in the Doha RoundlOO -- the joint 
proponents called for the following: (1) a "[r]ecognition of the strategic nature of 
cotton for development and poverty reduction in many LDCs," and (2) a "complete 
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phase-out of support measures for the production and export of cotton."lOl They added 
the following two specifics: 
Establishment at Cancun of a mechanism for phasing out support for 
cotton production with a view to its total elimination (early harvest): at 
the Ministerial Conference in Cancun, there should be a decision on 
immediate implementation, providing for substantial and accelerated 
reductions in each of the boxes of support for cotton production. This 
decision should set a specific date for the complete phase-out of cotton 
production support measures. 
Transitional measures for LDCs: until cotton production support 
measures have been completely eliminated, cotton producers in LDCs 
should be offered financial compensation to offset the income they are 
losing, as an integral part of the rights and obligations resulting from the 
Doha Round. 102 
In other words, countries that subsidize their cotton growers were expected to agree to 
a total elimination of domestic and export subsidies "immediately", i.e., at the 2003 
Cancun Ministerial Conference, and independent of any other commitments from other 
WTO members on other agricultural issues, i.e., the notion of an "early harvest" of 
WTO commitments. Until such time that cotton subsidies are completely eliminated, 
the Joint Proposal requests cotton growers in LDCs receive compensation offseting 
income lost as a result of such subsidies. The proposal further identifies the form of 
such compensation as "contractual financial compensation,,,103 noting that traditional 
forms of WTO "compensation" (tariff concessions to LDCs on other items of export 
interest to them and increased tariffs by LDCs on imports from developed countries) 
are inappropriate under the circumstances. 104 
The Cotton Initiative was formally made a part of the Cancun Ministerial 
Conference agenda. !Os Not surprisingly, WTO members' views differed widely over 
whether the Cotton Initiative should be discussed independently or whether it should 
be integrated into the broader negotiations on agricultural subsidies generally.106 They 
also differed over the question of compensation (how it should be paid and who should 
administer it). 107 
The Cotton Initiative was added to the draft Cancun Ministerial Declaration, 
but in a version that addressed both the trade and development dimensions of cotton 
production, making it more comprehensive than the version advocated by the 
Initiative's WCA proponents. !Os Significantly, the Cotton Initiative was presented 
separately from and independent of the overall framework for agricultural negotiations, 
321 
HeinOnline -- 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 322 2004-2005
Kennedy 
thus preserving the notion of an "early harvest" for international trade rules on cotton. 
With the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial Conference, however, no Ministerial 
Declaration was ever issued and, thus, no decision reached at Cancun on the Cotton 
Initiative. 109 The discussion did not end there, but instead was rolled over into 2004. 
The Cotton Initiative was exhaustively discussed at a two-day, WTO-sponsored 
workshop held in Cotonou, Benin in March 2004.110 While the trade aspects of the 
Initiative were a topic of the workshop, the development dimension was the major 
focus. III The participants examined ways in which to control for price volatility, 
including the establishment of a stabilization fund. 112 It was generally agreed that 
WCA countries needed to work within existing international financial and aid 
institutions, coupled with bilateral donor aid. 113 There was also support expressed for 
diversification and downstream, value-added production in textiles and clothing, as 
well as for the rehabilitation of derelict textile and clothing mills. I 14 
With pressure building to reach a framework agreement on modalities for 
conducting negotiations on agricultural trade, representatives from the WTO members 
met in Geneva in late July 2004 to attempt to bridge their differences. In the absence 
of such an agreement, many observers considered the Doha Development Agenda in 
serious trouble. 115 In early July 2004 the four WCA countries that had launched the 
Cotton Initiative were still demanding that cotton be treated independently of the 
agriCUlture negotiations. 116 In mid-July 2004, a group of 90 developing countries 
(known as the G90) echoed this demand by insisting that cotton subsidies,lbe dealt with 
as a stand-alone issue and outside the agriculture negotiations. ll7 The G90's position 
was met with resistance from USTR Robert Zoellick, who insisted that cotton 
subsidies be negotiated within the broader context of the agriculture negotiations. 118 
The European Union and the WTO Director General supported his position.11 9 In the 
end, perhaps knowing that Brazil would keep pressure on the United States on the 
issue of cotton subsidies,120 the G90 and the interested WCA countries receded from 
their demand that cotton be dealt with as a stand-alone item. 
After weeks of intense negotiations, an eleventh-hour framework agreement on 
agricultural negotiations was concluded on July 29-30, 2004, that includes a 
compromise reached between USTR Zoellick and the four WCA countries. 121 The 
cotton provision of the WTO General Council's decision on the Doha work program 
provides: 
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The General Council recognizes the importance of cotton for a certain 
number of countries and its vital importance for developing countries, 
especially LDCs. It will be addressed ambitiously, expeditiously, and 
specifically, within the agriculture negotiations. The provisions of this 
framework provide a basis for this approach, as does the sectoral 
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initiative on cotton. The Special Session of the Committee on 
Agriculture shall ensure appropriate prioritization of the cotton issue 
independently from other sectoral initiatives. A subcommittee on cotton 
will meet periodically and report to the Special Session of the 
Committee on Agriculture to review progress. Work shall encompass all 
trade distorting policies affecting the sector in all three pillars of market 
access, domestic support, and export competition, as specified in the 
Doha text and this Framework text. 122 
In addition, the General Council decision directs the Director General "to consult with 
the relevant international organizations, including the Bretton Woods Institutions [i.e., 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund], the Food and Agriculture 
Organization and the International Trade Centre to direct effectively existing 
programmes and any additional resources towards development of the economies 
where cotton has vital importance.,,123 
Thus, the July 30,2004 framework agreement on cotton makes cotton a priority 
in three respects: (1) cotton will be addressed "ambitiously, expeditiously, and 
specifically" as part of the Doha Round agriculture negotiations; (2) a subcommittee 
on cotton will be created that will meet periodically with the WTO Committee on 
Agriculture ensuring "appropriate prioritization of the cotton issue independently from 
other sectoral initiatives;" and (3) the WTO Director General is to work with 
international organizations, including the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund, to direct additional resources towards development of economies where cotton 
has vital importance. Predictably, the U.S.-based National Cotton Council and some 
members of Congress were opposed to any special agreements in the WTO that singled 
out cotton and cotton subsidies. 124 
Whether the WCA cotton producers actually will receive sgecial consideration 
in the Doha Round agriCUlture negotiations remains to be seen. 1 5 There is now no 
question that the negotiations will not be completed by the original deadline of January 
1,2005: the General Council decision of August 1, 2004, expressly acknowledges that 
the January 1, 2005 deadline for completing the Doha Round will not be met. 126 By 
most estimates, the Doha Round negotiations will not be completed until sometime in 
2006 or even later. 127 
While the high-wire act that is WTO agricultural negotiations, including special 
treatment for cotton, was being played out in Geneva in the summer of 2004, a less 
high-profile but equally dramatic development was quietly taking place at the same 
time: the full implementation of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. It is 
to that subject that I tum next. 
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING TRADE IN TEXTILES AND 
CLOTHING 
As noted in the Introduction, on January 1,2005, one of the greatest advantages 
that the SSA region enjoys under AGOA relative to developing countries and LDCs 
outside the region - namely, quota-free treatment of qualifying textile and clothing 
articles - will end. On that date, the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing was 
terminated, making all trade in textiles and clothing subject to regular GATT 
disciplines (in particular GATT Article XIX on safeguards, the WTO Agreement on 
Safeguards, and GAIT Article XI on quotas), although such trade will not become 
duty free on that date. This Part examines the impact that ATC termination will have 
on the SSA textile and clothing industry. Because cotton is, of course, a major input for 
textiles and clothing, Part IV will in tum examine the upstream impact on regional 
suppliers of cotton. A brief overview of the international trade regime for textiles and 
clothing for the past 40 years precedes a consideration of the impact of ATC 
termination. 
If one were forced to choose the most protected sector over the nearly 60-year 
history of the GA TTIWTO trade regime, steel, automobiles, agriculture, 
semiconductors, and footwear would all be contenders. Considering the length and the 
breadth of trade protection that the textile and clothing sector has received for over 
four decades, it would be hard to argue with one economist's conclusion that this 
sector was, and in the case of high tariffs will continue to be, "the most systematically 
and comprehensively protected sector in the world .... ,,128 
The history of U.S. trade protection for the textile and clothing industry can be 
traced back to the inter-war period. Under the Tariff Act of 1922 and the Tariff Act of 
1930 (the notorious Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act), the tariff wall erected for cotton goods 
was prohibitively high (46 percent ad valorem compared to 35 percent ad valorem for 
meat products and 31 percent ad valorem for chemicals ).129 Following the successful 
negotiation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the GAIT 
contracting parties still tended to keep in place their import restrictions on textiles and 
clothing from low-wage countries.130 
In search of a more comprehensive solution to the problem of surging textile 
imports, in 1960 GATT negotiators adopted the concept of "market disruption" that 
permitted contracting parties to impose import restraints on fairly traded but low-
priced textile imports without a showing of injury to the domestic textile industry when 
the price of such imports fell below a predetermined trigger price. 131 Using the 
"market disruption" test, importing countries were relieved of the GAIT Article XIX 
requirement of finding injury to the domestic industry before imposing safeguards 
measuresY2 Market disruption became the cornerstone of the 1961 Short-Term 
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Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles,133 the 1962 Long-Term 
Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (with extensions 
through 1973),134 and the successor Multifiber Arrangement that entered into force in 
1974, covering cotton and non-cotton textile products. 135 
The 1974 Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) was a framework agreement 
modeled after the Long Term Arrangement. Intended to be temporary, the MFA 
existed for two decades, governing the majority of world trade in textiles and 
clothing. 136 MFA Article 4 provided for the negotiation of bilateral export restraint 
agreements between textile exporting and textile importing countries, and for unilateral 
safeguard actions following a finding of market disrurtion.137 The MFA also provided 
for an annual quota growth rate of up to six percent. 13 Products covered under MFA I, 
II, and III included all manufactured products whose chief value and weight were in 
cotton, wool, man-made fibers, or blends thereof. 139 MFA IV expanded product 
coverage to include products made of vegetable fibers, such as linen and ramie, and of 
silk blends. 14o The MFA introduced some flexibility into an otherwise rigid system by 
permitting a specific quota to be exceeded by seven percent if there was a 
corresponding reduction in another quota (the so-called "swing provision,,).141 The 
MFA also permitted five percent of a future year's quota to be carried forward and 
borrowed, and up to 10 percent of an unused quota to be carried over to the next year. 
With every extension of the MFA, developing countries sought a commitment 
from developed countries to agree on a timetable for phasing out the MFA. That 
commitment was finally secured in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing. 
During the Uruguay Round negotiations, developing countries insisted that 
import restrictions on textile exports to developed countries be eliminated over a six-
year period. 142 Under intense pressure from the domestic textile industry, the United 
States took a more gradualist approach by advocating a ten-year phase-out of the MFA, 
the imposition of global (versus bilateral) quotas on textile trade, and a progressive 
increase in the size of quotas. 143 
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing reflects a blend of the parties' 
negotiating positions.l44 Under the ATC, trade in textiles and clothing was gradually 
brought under WTO disciplines. MFA quotas in effect on December 31, 1994, were 
carried forward into the ATC which phased out MFA quotas over ten years ending 
January 1,2005, through two mechanisms: product integration and quota acceleration. 
First, the A TC integrated trade in the textile and clothing sector into the WTO 
multilateral trade system over a ten-year transition period, making such trade subject to 
the normal WTO rules on permissible trade restrictions, including tariffs, antidumping 
and countervailing duties, and GATT Article XIX safeguard measures. 145 With the 
entry into force of the ATC, each importing WTO member integrated into GATT 1994 
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at least 16 percent of the total 1990 volume of textile and clothing products imported 
by the member. 146 By January 1998 (37 months after entry into force of the ATC), 
members had integrated another 17 percent of the total 1990 volume of textile and 
clothing products imported by the member. 147 By January 2002 (85 months after entry 
into force of the A TC) members integrated another 18 percent of the total 1990 volume 
of textile and clothing products imported by the Member. 148 Finally, by January 2005 
(121 months after entry into force of the ATC), the remaining 49 percent of textiles 
and clothing trade was integrated immediately.149 The ATC and all restrictions 
thereunder stood terminated in January 2005, on which date the textiles and clothing 
sector became fully integrated into GATT 1994,150 subject, of course, to existing 
customs duties. In that connection, tariffs on clothing remain among the highest of all 
duties assessed on goods imported into the United States. 151 
Second, the ATC provided for a ten-year phase-out of all quotas maintained on 
non-integrated products that were established under bilateral agreements entered into 
under the MF As. 152 The A TC also required enhanced market access for textile-
exporting countries. Article 2 provided for annual quota growth during each stage of 
the integration process. During Stage 1, which ended on December 31, 1997, the quota 
level under MFA bilateral agreements in force prior to the effective date of the ATC 
were increased annually by not less than the growth rate established under the bilateral 
agreement, plus an additional 16 percent. 153 The level of each remaining restriction 
had to be increased annually during Stage 2 (which ended December 31,2001) by the 
growth rate established during Stage 1, increased by an additional 25 percent. 154 
Similarly, during Stage 3 (which ended December 31, 2004) the growth rate could not 
be less than the growth rate established during Stage 2, increased by an additional 27 
percent. 155 
As part of the integration process, Article 7 obligated members to improve 
market access for textile and clothing products through the following measures: (1) 
tariff reductions and bindings, (2) the reduction or elimination of non-tariff barriers, (3) 
the facilitation of customs procedures, and (4) the fair and equitable treatment of 
textiles and clothing under antidumping, countervailing duty, and intellectual property 
laws. Members further committed not to introduce changes in their tariff classification 
schemes that would adversely affect market access. 156 
Thus, on January 1,2005, world trade in textiles and clothing became subject to 
the normal legal disciplines of GATT, in particular safeguards reliert57 and the 
prohibition on quantitative restrictions. 158 Surprisingly, several developing countries 
have expressed reservations about the termination of the ATC. 159 I say "surprisingly" 
because so many developing countries groused about the slow pace of integrating 
textiles and clothing into the multilateral trade system during the ATC's ten-year 
implementation period. 160 The source of their reservations is that China and India are 
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predicted to capture significant inarket share in the textile and clothing sector that had 
otherwise been guaranteed to other developing countries under A TC. quota allocations 
(in the case of China, "significant market share" translates into a staggering 50% 
market share). With the end of ATC quotas in 2005 that guaranteed market share will 
vanish, or so they contend. Consequently, some developing countries, as well as U.S. 
textile industry representatives that source from countries other than China and India, 
called for an extension of the ATC. 161 Particularly vulnerable are the countries of sub-
Saharan Africa. 
In 2003, the U.S. International Trade Commission concluded a two-year 
investigation into the impact that termination of the A TC would have on world trade in 
clothing and textiles. 162 The Commission concluded that China is expected to become 
the "supplier of choice" for most U.S. importers (namely, the large clothing companies 
and retailers) because of its ability to make almost any type of textile and clothing 
product at any quality level at a· competitive price. 163 However, the extent to which 
China continues to expand its shipments following quota elimination in 2005 will be 
tempered by the uncertainty over the use by the United States of the textile-specific 
safeguard provision contained in China's WTO protocol of accession. l64 To reduce the 
risk of sourcing from only one country, U.S. importers also plan to expand trade 
relationships with other low-cost countries as alternatives to China, particularly with 
India which also has a very large manufacturing base for textiles and clothing and a 
large supply of relatively low-cost, skilled labor.165 One or two other low-cost 
exporting countries in South Asia -- Bangladesh or Pakistan -- are expected to emerge 
as major suppliers for a narrower but still significant range of goodS. 166 Some U.S. 
importers have indicated they would also consider beneficiary countries under the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA),167 particularly those located in 
Central America, as a major source of supply if a Central American or hemispheric 
free-trade agreement is negotiated that allows the use of third-country fabrics. 168 
In the ASEAN region, the only countries considered competitive as major 
alternate suppliers to China or India are Vietnam and Indonesia. 169 However, although 
both countries have an abundant supply of low-cost labor, Vietnam will not be eligible 
for quota elimination until it becomes a WTO member, while Indonesia is considered 
somewhat risky because of its political and social unrest. 170 
The anticipated effects of ATC quota elimination for five of the six major clothing 
producers in SSA and for the world's other major textile and clothing producers are 
summarized below in Tables 7 and 8, respectively: 
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TABLE 7. ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF A TC QUOTA ELIMINATION FOR SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
Anticipated effects of quota removal 
Sub-Saharan Africa Summary: 
Industry sources indicated that this 
region's overall share of U.S. clothing 
imports will fall, notwithstanding AGOA 
preferences. 
AGOA preferences may spur U.S. firms 
to source products from the region that are 
subject to high U.S. duty rates, such as 
manmade fiber and wool clothing, 
particularly if the provision allowing for 
the use of third-country fabrics is 
extended beyond 2004. Some sourcing of 
basic garments made in the region from 
local fabrics, such as pants and knit tops, 
may also continue. 
Kenya: 
Share of U.S. clothing imports is likely to 
decline. 
Lesotho: 
Share of U.S. clothing imports is likely to 
decline. 
Madagascar: 
Share of U.S. clothing imports is likely to 
decline. 
Mauritius: 
Share of U.S. clothing imports is likely to 
decline. 
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Contributing factors 
Sub-Saharan Africa Summary: 
Products - Produces basic, rather than 
fashion clothing. Most manufacturers do 
not offer full-package services. Many 
firms have limited capacity to offer large 
volumes that may be required by U.S. 
firms looking to consolidate sourcing 
following quota removal. 
Infrastructure - Infrastructure and logistics 
inferior to those in other regions of the 
world. Shipping time longer than that 
from East Asia. 
Kenya: 
Business climate - Personal safety is an 
issue for sourcing from country. 
Lesotho: 
Inputs - No domestic yarn or fabric 
supply. Planned investment in new yarn 
and knit fabric production capacity. 
Madagascar: 
Business climate - Political unrest in 2001 
and 2002 resulted in large disinvestment 
in the industry. Government is trying to 
restart the industry, but future prospects 
are uncertain. 
Mauritius: 
Labor- High labor costs owing to shortage 
of labor. Competition for workers from 
high-tech sectors. 
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Inputs - Shortage of cotton yam 
production for knit clothing. Planned 
investment in new yam spinning capacity. 
South Africa: South Africa: 
Share of U.S. clothing imports is likely to Labor - Relatively high labor costs. 
decline. 
Inputs - Domestic supply of yams and 
fabrics. Only SSA country producing 
synthetic filament yam. 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission, Textile & Clothing Report 
TABLE 8. ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF ATC QUOTA ELIMINATION FOR MAJOR 
TEXTILE & CLOTHING PRODUCERS 
East Asia Summary: 
U.S. clothing companies and retailers are 
likely to expand sourcing from the region 
and continue close relationships with 
suppliers in the region, who are major 
sources of textile and clothing investment 
worldwide. 
China: 
Likely to be supplier of choice for most 
large U.S. clothing companies and 
retailers; uncertainty regarding textile-
specific safeguards may temper export 
growth. Over the long term, 
competitiveness may diminish as strong 
economic growth leads to greater 
domestic demand for textiles and 
clothing, and for the labor and capital to 
make these goods. Showed tremendous 
growth in export of goods for which it 
became eligible for quota-free entry in 
2002. 
Taiwan: 
Likely to continue as major suppliers of 
East Asia Summary: 
Labor - Sewing skills considered among 
the best in the world. 
Inputs - Substantial manufacturing base 
for raw materials. 
Transportation - Best shipping times to 
the U.S. west coast within Asia. 
China: 
Labor - Per-unit labor costs very low due 
to low wages and high productivity. 
Inputs - Produces fabrics, trim, packaging, 
and most other components used to make 
clothing and made-up textile articles. 
Products - Considered by industry among 
the best in making most garments and 
made-up textile articles at any quality or 
price level. World's largest producer and 
exporter of textiles and clothing, 
notwithstanding tight quotas in major 
world import markets. 
Taiwan: 
Labor - High per-unit labor costs; high 
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fabrics to global industry, including to labor productivity. 
China. However, U.S. firms are likely to 
move sourcing of clothing to lower-cost Products - Small, flexible sewing lines 
countries, particularly China; may advantageous for fashion clothing; highly 
continue to source certain . garments from automated sewing lines for dress shirts; 
these suppliers (e.g., men's dress shirts, offer full-package services. 
dresses, and other fashion clothing). 
South Asia Summary: 
U.S. firms will likely expand sourcing 
from South Asia with the removal of 
quotas in 2005. 
India: 
Likely to remain a competitive supplier to 
the United States when quotas are 
removed in 2005. Considered by many 
U.S. firms the primary alternative to 
China. Over the long term, 
competitiveness may diminish as strong 
economic growth leads to greater 
domestic demand for textiles and 
clothing, and for the labor and capital to 
make these goods. 
Pakistan: 
Likely to continue as a supplier to the 
U.S. market. Considered by many U.S. 
firms as a competitive alternative to 
China, particularly for men's clothing. 
May continue to be a global supplier of 
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South Asia Summary: 
Inputs - Huge manufacturing base for 
yarns and fabrics. 
Competitive position - Most competitive 
alternative to China as a supplier, but 
competitiveness of each country varies 
widely. 
India: 
Labor - Huge, relatively inexpensive, 
skilled workforce; has design expertise. 
Inputs - Among the world's largest 
producers of yams and fabrics. 
Products - Wide range of clothing; 
considered a competitive source for home 
textiles (e.g., bed linens and towels). 
Business climate - Personal safety, 
security of shipments between factories 
and ports and bureaucratic red tape and 
infrastructure are issues, with many U.S. 
firms using agents in lieu of dealing 
directly with producers. 
Pakistan: 
Labor - Large, relatively inexpensive 
labor supply. 
Inputs - Access to local supplies of raw 
cotton. 
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cotton yarns and fabrics. 
ASEAN Summary 
Overall share of U.S. textile and clothing 
imports is likely to decline as U.S. firms 
reduce sourcing in all but a few countries. 
Business climate - The Government is 
taking steps to ensure the global 
competitiveness of the textile and clothing 
sector; personal safety and security of 
shipments between factories and ports are 
issues. 
ASEAN Summary 
Labor - Costs relatively high in all 
ASEAN countries except Indonesia and 
non-WTO member Vietnam which is 
ineligible for quota liberalization. 
Transportation - Shipping times to the 
U.S. west coast average 45 days, 
compared with 12 to 18 days from China. 
Indonesia: Indonesia: 
Future status as a supplier to the U.S. Labor - Abundant supply of low-cost, 
market uncertain. Many U.S. firms skilled labor. 
consider Indonesia to be a competitive 
supplier, but indicated its political and Inputs - Huge manufacturing base for raw 
social unrest may discourage future materials, especially synthetic fibers, 
sourcing. yarns, and fabrics. 
Business Climate - Frequent political and 
social unrest likely to deter growth in 
sourcing in the short term. 
Thailand: Thailand: 
Share of U.S. imports is likely to decline, Labor - Highly-skilled workforce; high 
as has already occurred in goods for wages, partly because of a labor shortage. 
which quotas were eliminated (e.g., Inputs - Domestic supply of yarns and 
babies' clothing and luggage); may fabrics. 
become a niche supplier of garments 
having complex construction or detailed Products - Strong needlework skills and 
sewing requirements. small-scale factories enable intricately 
designed garments and flexibility in 
sourcing fashion clothing. 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission, Textile & Clothing Report 
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Although many countries may see their share of the U.S. textile and clothing 
market decline, the ITC reports that many countries likely will become second-tier 
suppliers to U.S. clothing companies and retailers as U.S. firms strive to balance cost, 
flexibility, speed, and risk in their sourcing strategies by looking to the second-tier 
suppliers to meet needs not met by the first-tier suppliers. l7l The production of certain 
goods likely will remain in Mexico and the CBERA region to service U.S. buyers' 
quick turnaround or mid-season order requirements. In 
Again, none of this is particularly welcome news for SSA clothing 
manufacturers. As far as the ATC termination's impact on cotton production is 
concerned, the International Cotton Advisory Committeel73 predicts that the 
termination of ATC quotas will have no positive impact on cotton's market share 
because polyester remains cheaper than cotton. 174 Other studies predict that the price 
of cotton will increase by 4 percent with the full implementation of the ATC because 
the demand for cotton clothing will increase as its price drops after A TC quota 
elimination. 175 What requires closer analysis at this juncture is U.S. trade and 
development policy for sub-Saharan Africa, in particular the textile and clothing 
provisions of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and whether AGOA will 
mitigate the impact of ATC termination for the SSA region, including its cotton 
growers. 
III. U.S. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
A. Overview 
Core U.S. trade and development policy for sub-Saharan Africa is codified in 
the African Growth and 0ff0rtunity Act (AGOA), enacted by Congress in May 
2000/76 amended in 2002,1 and amended again in 2004.178 An ancillary piece of 
legislation that is also designed to promote development in the region (although it does 
not specifically target sub-Saharan Africa) is the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 
(discussed in further detail in Part III.D below). 
As originally enacted, AGOA had three broad objectives: (1) to increase trade 
and investment between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa, (2) to strengthen 
the private sector in SSA nations, and (3) to encourage political and economic reform 
in the region. 179 Briefly, AGOA modifies the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) programl80 by authorizing the President to provide duty-free and quota-free 
treatment for certain African products until September 30, 2008. AGOA also provides 
for graduation of countries from the program when they become high-income countries 
and for the removal of eligibility of articles under certain conditions. 181 AGOA further 
authorizes the President to provide duty-free treatment under the GSP for any article if 
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the ITC has determined that the article is not import sensitive in the context of imports 
from SSA countries. 182 
Under AGOA I President Clinton designated 1,835 tariff line items as AGOA-
eligible only,183 in addition to the 4,600 items that are already GSP-eligible. 184 Added 
to the AGOA-eligible list are certain agricultural and steel products, footwear, luggage, 
handbags, watches, and flatware. 185 AGOA also eliminates the competitive need 
limitation that exists under GSP that caps duty-free benefits to beneficiary countries. 186 
On December 31, 2003, President Bush designated 37 of the 48 sub-Saharan African 
countries as eligible for tariff preferences under AGOA. 187 
On August 2, 2002, President Bush signed the Trade Act of 2002, modifying 
certain provisions of AGOA and expanding preferential access for imports from SSA 
beneficiary countries. The modifications were collectively referred to as AGOA 11. 188 
In July 2004, Congress approved a seven-year extension of AGOA II until September 
30, 2015 (AGOA II was set to expire in 2008).189 Congress also authorized a tbree-
year extension until 2007 of the so-called "third-country fabric" provision for lesser-
developed SSA countries (explained below).190 These 2004 extensions are known as 
AGOA III. 
It probably comes as no surprise that trade volumes between the United States 
and sub-Saharan Africa are small: Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for less than 2 percent 
of U.S. merchandise imports. 191 The United States purchased almost 21 Rercent of SSA 
exports in 2002, less than half of the European Union's 43.3 percent. 92 In 2003, 71 
percent of the $25.6 billion in U.S. imports from sub-Saharan Africa were petroleum 
products. 193 Once those exports are excluded, U.S. imports from SSA were slightly 
less than $7.4 billion.194 AGOA-specific imports accounted for 55 percent of total 
imports from the reftion in 2003. Eighty percent of U.S. imports under AGOA were 
petroleum products. 95 Excluding oil imports (in essence synonymous with "excluding 
imports from Angola and Nigeria which account for 57 percent of total SSA exports to 
the United States, most of which is in the form of oil,,196), AGOA imports were less 
than $3 billion, with textile and clothing imports accounting for $1.5 billion, or about 6 
percent of total U.S. imports from the region. 197 U.S. clothing imports from sub-
Saharan Africa account for just slightly more than 2 percent of total U.S. imports of 
such productS. 198 In other words, the region's share of total U.S. clothing imports is 
quite small. 
B. AGOA Textile and Clothing Benefits 
AGOA's rules of origin are essentially bifurcated: there is one rule of origin for 
non-textile and clothing products and special rules of origin for textiles and clothing. 199 
As is true for non-textile and clothing articles, AGOA provides duty-free and quota-
free treatment for eligible clothing articles made in qualifying sub-Saharan African 
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countries. 200 However, not only are the rules of origin for textiles and clothing more 
stringent, but the rules on eligibility for the textile and clothing benefits are also more 
onerous. Thus, although 37 of the 48 eligible sub-:Saharan African nations have 
qualified for AGOA benefits generally, as of April 2004, only 24 of those 37 SSA 
countries were eligible to receive AGOA's specific clothing benefits.z°1 Qualifying 
clothing articles include the following: 202 
• Clothing made of U.S. yams and fabrid;203 
• Clothing made of sub-Saharan African (regional) yams and fabrics, 
subject to a cap; 
• Clothing made in a designated SSA lesser-developed country of third-
country yams and fabrics, subject to a cap; 
• Clothing made of yams and fabrics not produced in commercial 
quantities in the United States; 
• Certain cashmere and merino wool sweaters; and 
• Eligible handloomed, handmade, or folklore articles. 
Under AGO A I, clothing imports made from sub-Saharan African fabric and yam were 
subject to an initial cap of 1.5 percent of overall U.S. clothing imports, increasing to 
3.5 percent of overall imports over an 8-year period. The 2002 AGOA amendments 
doubled the applicable percentages of the cap to 7 percent. The regional fabric 
quantities are recalculated for each subsequent year and the percentage figure increases 
incrementally in equal annual increases to a level of 7 percent beginning October 1, 
2007. Clothing articles entered in excess of these quantities are subject to otherwise 
applicable tariffs, although the odds of quantities in excess of the cap actually being 
exported to the United States appear low. The quota-fill rate for 2001 was 16.95 
percent; for 2002, 59.93 cEercent; for 2003, 34.94 percent; and for the first six months 
of 2004, 18.02 percent.2 The duty-free c~ is not allocated among countries, but is 
filled on a "first-come, first-served" basis.2o 
AGOA limits imports of clothing made with regional or third-country fabric to 
a fixed percentage of the aggregate square meter equivalents (SME) of all clothing 
articles imported into the United States during the preceding year. The Trade Act of 
2002 increased the quantitative limitation for clothing made with regional fabric. 
AGOA III extended the regional fabric provision until September 2015, but provided 
that the increase would not apply to clothing imported under the special provision for 
lesser-developed countries that allows textile and clothing imports to be made of third-
country fabrics, i.e., fabrics other than of U.S. or SSA origin, through September 2007 
(explained more fully below). Thus, for the year beginning October 1, 2003, the 
aggregate quantity of imports eligible for preferential treatment under these provisions 
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was an amount not to exceed 4.7931 percent of all clothing articles imported into the 
United States in the precedin~ 12-month period for which data was available, which 
equaled 956,568,715 SME.20 The percentage increases annually until it reaches 7 
percent of total U.S. imports, at which point it is capped. 207 
Extending the special textile and clothing benefits accorded lesser-developed 
SSA countries through September 30, 2007 that were set to ex~ire September 30, 2004, 
AGOA III permits lesser-developed beneficiary countries2 8 to obtain preferential 
treatment for clothing assembled in beneficiary countries regardless of the origin of the 
fabric. 209 Under this Special Rule (also referred to as the third-country fabric 
provision), clothing imports are subject to a sub-cap within the overall 7-percent cap. 
Under AGOA I, Special Rule imports and regional fabric imports were capped 
together at 1.5 percent that could increase to no more than 3.5 percent of total U.S. 
clothing imports. The AGOA II amendments doubled the overall cap to 7 percent, but 
maintained a sub-cap for clothing imported into the United States under the Special 
Rule. For FY 2003 the Special Rule cap was 2.0714 percent and rose to 2.3571 percent 
in FY 2004?1O The AGOA II amendments also granted lesser-developing country 
beneficiary status to Botswana and Namibia, qualifying both countries for the Special 
Rule.2l1 . 
While AGOA III extends the Special Rule for three years through September 
2007, and while it increases the Special Rule quota cap annually through FY 2006, it 
drastically reduces the Special Rule cap in the third year (FY 2007) of the three-year 
extension to 68 percent of the FY 2004 cap, i.e., from 2.3571 percent to 1.6071 
percent.212 Although the quota-fill rate under the Special Rule was only14.39 percent 
in 2001, it increased to 50.71 percent in 2002, to 61.99 percent in 2003, and to 32.21 
percent for the fust six months of 2004 (64.42 percent on an annualized basis).213 Most 
AGOA clothing imports in 2002 entered under the Special Rule.214 This reduction in 
the quota cap could have a negative impact on the SSA lesser-developed beneficiary 
countries. Imports of such clothing totaled about $600 million in 2002, of which more 
than half ($318 million) came from Lesotho, whose AGOA shipments of $321 million 
consisted almost entirely of such goods made from third-country fabric. 215 Other major 
SSA suppliers of clothing under the Special Rule were Kenya ($121 million), 
Swaziland ($74 million), and Madagascar ($69 million). All but two (Mauritius and 
South Africa) of the 20 SSA countries that have met the additional requirements to 
qualify for AGO A clothing preferences are also eligible for the lesser-developed 
country benefits.216 
AGOA also provides duty- and quota-free benefits for handloomed, handmade, 
or folklore articles made in beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries. This provision 
is known as "Category 9".217 In Executive Order 13191, the President authorized 
CIT A, after consultation with the Commissioner of Customs, to consult with 
beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries and to determine which, if any, particular 
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textile and clothing goods are to be treated as being handloomed, handmade, or 
folklore articles. As of March 2004, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Namibia, Swaziland, and Zambia had been approved for the handloomed and the 
"handmade of handloomed" frovisions.218 Ghana is the only SSA country to have 
benefits for folklore articles.21 
c. Other Trade and Development Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa Under 
AGOA 
In addition to AGOA's trade benefits, development assistance is a key part of 
U.S. policy for the region. The following programs and activities have been put in 
place to aid sub-Saharan Africa: 
· U.S.-Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Forum. AGOA directs the 
President to organize a U.S.-Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Forum (known 
as the AGOA Forum), to be hosted by the U.S. Secretaries of State, Commerce, 
Treasury, and the U.S. Trade Representative.22o The AGOA Forum meets annually and 
serves as the vehicle for a regular dialogue between the United States and SSA 
countries on issues of economics, trade, and investment.221 
· Expansion of the Foreign Commercial Service in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
U.S. Secretary of Commerce is directed to ensure that at least twenty full-time 
Commercial Service employees are assigned in at least ten different SSA countries, 
subject to the availability of appropriations.222 In addition, the International Trade 
Administration is to identify and work to eliminate barriers to U.S. export trade to the 
region.223 
· Department of Agriculture Technical Assistance. AGOA I called on the 
Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with U.S. land grant colleges and universities 
and not-for-profit international organizations, to conduct a 2-year study on ways to 
improve the flow of American farming techniques and practices to African farmers. 224 
· Technical Assistance from u.s. Agency for International Development. The 
Development Fund for Africa that was created in 1988 is to be tapped to support 
programs and activities that promote the long term economic development of sub-
Saharan Africa, such as programs and activities relating to the following: 
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(A) Strengthening primary and vocational education systems, 
especially the acquisition of middle-level technical skills for operating 
modem private businesses and the introduction of college level business 
education, including the study of international business, finance, and 
stock exchanges. 
(B) Strengthening health care systems. 
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(C) Supporting democratization, good governance and civil society 
and conflict resolution efforts. 
(D) Increasing food security by promoting the expansion of 
agricultural and agriculture-based industrial production and productivity 
and increasing real incomes for poor individuals. 
(E) Promoting an enabling environment for private sector-led growth 
through sustained economic reform, privatization programs, and 
market-led economic activities. 
(F) Promoting decentralization and local participation in the 
development process, especially linking the rural production sectors and 
the industrial and market centers throughout Africa. 
(G) Increasing the technical and managerial capacity of sub-Saharan 
African individuals to manage the economy of sub-Saharan Africa. 
(H) Ensuring sustainable economic growth through environmental 
protection.225 
The African Development Foundation (a U.S. corporation) supports the foregoing 
activities, including the provision of capital to micro- and small-enterprises in the 
region.226 
· Free Trade Agreements with Sub-Saharan Africa. In AGO A I Congress 
declared that free trade agreements should be negotiated, where feasible, with 
interested countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in order to serve as the catalyst for 
increasing trade between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa and increasing 
private sector investment in sub-Saharan Africa.227 In November 2002, U.S. Trade 
Representative Zoellick notified Congress of the decision to negotiate a free trade 
agreement with the Southern African Customs Union, whose membership is comprised 
of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.228 
· Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for African Affairs. In AGO A I, 
Congress created the post of Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for African Affairs 
who is to be (1) a primary point of contact in the executive branch for those persons 
engaged in trade between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa, and (2) the chief 
advisor to the United States Trade Representative on issues of trade and investment 
with Africa. 229 
· Debt Relief. In 1997, the Group of Seven, the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund adopted the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative, a commitment by the international community that all multilateral and 
bilateral creditors, acting in a coordinated and concerted fashion, would reduce poor 
country debt to a sustainable level. In AGO A I Congress directed that it and the 
President should work together to make comprehensive debt relief available to the 
world's poorest countries in a manner that promotes economic growth and poverty 
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alleviation?30 In July 2003 the World Bank classified 26 LDCs as severely indebted 
(this represents over half of the total number of severely indebted countries).231 Thirty-
two of the LDCs are also classified as highly indebted poor countries (HIPCS).232 HIPC 
debt is projected to fall from an estimated $77 billion to $32 billion after the full 
delivery of traditional debt relief and assistance under the HIPC Initiative, and to $26 
billion after the delivery of additional bilateral relief committed by several creditors.233 
However, it has been observed that official development assistance to sub-Saharan 
Africa from all sources declined 29 percent from 1990 to 2002.234 
. Technical Assistance To Promote Economic Reforms and Development. In 
AGOA I Congress directed the President to target development assistance toward the 
following areas: 
(1) developing relationships between United States firms and firms 
in sub-Saharan Africa through a variety of business associations and 
networks; 
(2) providing assistance to the governments of sub-Saharan African 
countries to-
(A) liberalize trade and promote exports; 
(B) bring their legal regimes into compliance with the standards 
of the World Trade Organization in conjunction with membership 
in that Organization; 
(C) make financial and fiscal reforms; and 
(D) promote greater agribusiness linkages; 
(3) addressing such critical agricultural policy Issues as market 
liberalization, agricultural export development, and agribusiness 
investment in processing and transporting agricultural commodities; 
(4) increasing the number of reverse trade missions to growth-
oriented countries in sub-Saharan Africa; 
(5) increasing trade in services; and 
(6) encouraging greater sub-Saharan African participation in future 
negotiations in the World Trade Organization on services and making 
further commitments in their schedules to the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services in order to encourage the removal of tariff and 
nontariff barriers?35 
. OPIC Initiatives. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation is to create 
one or more funds, with combined assets of up to $500,000,000, to be used in support 
of infrastructure projects in sub-Saharan Africa. The funds are to be used to provide 
support in particular to women entrepreneurs and to innovative investments that 
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expand opportunities for women and maximize employment opportunities for poor 
individuals.236 
. Export-Import Bank Initiatives. The Board of Directors of the Export-Import 
Bank is to continue to take comprehensive measures, consistent with the credit 
standards otherwise required by law, to promote the expansion of the Bank's financial 
commitments in sub-Saharan Africa under the loan, guarantee, and insurance programs 
of the Bank.237 
. HIVIAIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Initiative and Assistance. The 
HIV/AIDS statistics for sub-Saharan Africa are both chilling and sobering:238 
- Approximately 71 percent of the world's HIV positive 
population lives in sub-Saharan Africa. 
- HIV/AIDS has decreased average life expectancy in sub-
Saharan Africa from 50 years in 1990 to 46 years in 2001. 
- While AIDS killed approximately 2.3 million sub-Saharan 
Africans in 2003, 3.2 million people in the region became 
infected that same year. 
- The HIV/AIDS pandemic has cost the region a 1.7 percent 
annual decline in income from 1990 to 2000. 
Congress directed that the private sector should be encouraged to assist sub-Saharan 
Africa in fighting HIV/AIDS,239 and that addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis in sub-
Saharan Africa should be a central component of U.S. foreign policy with respect to 
sub-Saharan Africa.24o It is disconcerting to observe, however, that to date Canada is 
the only WTO member to enact legislation authorizing the compulsory licensing of 
drugs that combat HIV/AIDS,241 pursuant to the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health242 and the 2003 General 
Council Decision implementing the Doha Ministerial Conference Declaration.243 
. Combating Desertification in Africa. Congress directed that the United States 
should expeditiously work with the international community, particularly Africa and 
other countries affected by desertification to achieve the following: 
(1) strengthen international cooperation to combat desertification; 
(2) promote the development of national and regional strategies to 
address desertification and increase public awareness of this serious 
problem and its effects; 
(3) develop and implement national action programs that identify the 
causes of desertification and measures to address it; and 
(4) recognize the essential role of local governments and 
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nongovernmental organizations in developing and implementing 
measures to address desertification.244 
. Infrastructure Assistance. A number of U.S. agencies, primarily the 
Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the 
Department of Energy, have been working to imgrove transportation, communications, 
and energy infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa. 45 
D. The Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 
The Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (MCA or Act) is a foreign aid program 
that had its genesis with President George W. Bush's announcement of American 
support for the U.N. Millennium Declaration.246 Consistently with the development 
and poverty eradication goals of the U.N. Millennium Declaration,247 the purpose of 
the MCA is to provide U.S. assistance for global development in a manner that 
promotes economic growth, eliminates extreme poverty, strengthens good governance, 
fosters economic freedom, and encourages investment in people.248 
Enacted in 2004, the MCA was initially funded with $1 billion for FY2004?49 
Section 606(a) of the Act provides that low to low middle income developing countries 
are able to compete for funding from the Millennium Challenge Account if they meet 
three broad criteria: (1) they are eligible for assistance from the International 
Development Association; (2) they have a per capita income equal to or less than the 
historic ceiling of the International Development Association ($1415 for FY 2004); 
and (3) they are not subject to legal provisions that prohibit them from receiving 
United States economic assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended.25o 
The Act requires the Millennium Challenge Corporation ("MCC") to take a 
number of steps to determine the countries that will be eligible to receive Millennium 
Challenge Account assistance during a fiscal year, based on their demonstrated 
commitment to just and democratic governance, economic freedom and investing in 
their people. These steps include identifying (1) the "candidate countries" for MCA 
assistance;251 (2) the eligibility criteria and methodology that the MCC Board of 
Directors will use to select "eligible countries" from among the "candidate 
countries,,;252 and (3) (a) the countries determined by the Board to be "eligible 
countries" for a fiscal year, (b) the countries on the list of eligible countries with which 
the Board will seek to enter into MCA "Compacts", and (c) a justification for such 
decisions?53 The purpose of a Compact is to create a multi-year plan for the eligible 
country to achieve specific development objectives?54 Key areas of focus for MCA 
funding include poverty reduction, health, education, agricultural development, 
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enterprise and private sector development, governance, trade and investment capacity, 
and environmentally sustainable development.255 Assistance under the Act may be 
provided in the form of grants, cooperative agreements, or contracts to or with the 
national government of the eligible country, regional or local governmental units of the 
country, or a nongovernmental organization or a private entity.256 
In February 2004, the Millennium Challenge Corporation identified 63 
countries as candidates for MCA assistance in FY2004. Nearly half of them (31) are 
located in sub-Saharan Africa, and included the cotton-producing nations of Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali.257 These candidate countries were later evaluated by the 
MCC Board to determine whether they should be eligible to submit proposals for MCC 
funding, based on an assessment of their commitment to development.258 The MCC 
Board assessed the degree to which the political and economic conditions in these 
candidate countries serve to promote poverty reduction and broad-based sustainable 
economic growth and, thus, provide a sound environment for the use of MCC funds.2s9 
On May 6, 2004, the MCC Board winnowed the field of 63 candidate countries to 16 
(half of which are in sub-Saharan Africa) when it announced the selection of countries 
that are eligible to apply for funding under the Millennium Challenge Account:26o 
Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Cape Verde, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and 
Vanuatu.261 Burkina Faso and Chad did not make the final cut. 
At this very early stage of the MCA, it is not possible to assess its impact on the 
SSA region. What seems reasonably clear at the moment, however, is that only a 
handful of countries in the region will ever be eligible at any given time for receipt of 
MCA funding. 262 Moreover, of the $1 billion appropriated in FY2004, the 
Congressional Budget Office estimates that the amount actually spent will be as low as 
$130 million?63 
Thus, against the foregoing backdrop of ATC termination and U.S. trade and 
development policy for sub-Saharan Africa reflected in AGOA, what is the interplay of 
the two? The next section examines that question. 
E. The Interplay of AGOA III and ATe Termination 
Before examining the interplay of AGOA III and termination of the ATC, some 
facts about textile and clothing imports from sub-Saharan Africa will provide some 
essential background. As reported by the International Trade Commission, sub-
Saharan Africa is a relatively small supplier of textiles and clothin~ to the global 
market, accounting for less than 1 percent of world exports in 2001? Nevertheless, 
SSA textile and clothing exports have been growing in recent years, particularly to the 
United States, largely as a result of duty-free and quota-free access to the U.S. market 
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under AGOA?65 SSA textile and clothing production and exports tend to be 
concentrated in a few countries: Mauritius, Madagascar, South Africa, Lesotho, and 
Kenya,266 although Swaziland has recently increased production and exports.267 
The majority of SSA textile and clothing sector production and exports consists 
of clothing, with U.S. textile and clothing imports from sub-Saharan Africa consisting 
almost entirely of clothing.268 South Africa and Mauritius are the only SSA countries 
with an established textile sector, with South Africa being the largest SSA exporter of 
textiles.269 Notwithstanding its small share of world exports, the SSA region is an 
important source of clothing for a number of U.S. clothing companies.27o 
SSA clothing exports are concentrated in garments characterized by long 
production runs, low labor content, and few styling changes, such as basic trousers, T-
shirts, sweaters, and woven shirts?7I U.S. imports of these basic products from major 
suppliers outside the SSA region have been highly constrained by quotas272 that were 
eliminated with the termination of the A TC. Cotton pants, knit tops, and cotton 
trousers accounted for 73 Rercent of the total value of U.S. clothing imports from sub-
Saharan Africa in 2002.2 During 1997-2002, U.S. imports of these garments from 
sub-Saharan Africa grew by 196 percent, compared to 86-percent growth in U.S. 
imports of other SSA clothing.274 Other clothing articles of which imports from SSA 
have been increasing include manmade-fiber shirts and pants, which accounted for 13 
percent of the total value of U.S. clothing imports from sub-Saharan Africa in 2002 
and which increased by 550 percent during 1997-2002. 
Clothing producers in South Africa, Mauritius, and Lesotho have stated that 
most clothing factories in these and other SSA countries were set up to benefit from 
quota-free access to the U.S. and EU markets.275 These companies indicated that U.S. 
and EU quotas on cotton trousers and T-shirts from other supplying countries, 
especially those in Asia, have encouraged foreign investors to produce clothing in 
SSA.276 Another expanding area of exports, particularly for South Africa, Lesotho, and 
Kenya, is manmade-fiber sportswear, for which major world suppliers are also subject 
to U.S. and EU quotas?77 In addition, South Africa and, until 2002, Mada¥,ascar have 
been expanding exports of wool suits, another quota-constrained product. 78 In short, 
SSA clothing exports of quota products - which enter quota-free and duty-free under 
AGO A -- are significant,279 meaning that when quotas are terminated in 2005 
producers outside the region will stand to benefit relative to the region.28o 
Besides AGOA benefits, SSA countries receive preferential trade benefits from 
the European Union under the Cotonou Agreement. The Cotonou Agreement provides 
duty-free and quota-free access for textiles and clothing from Africa, Caribbean, and 
Pacific (ACP) countries originating in the region.281 An exception is South Africa, 
which does not receive trade benefits under the Cotonou Agreement but has a free 
trade agreement with the European Union?82 
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In 2002, U.S. imports of clothing entered under AGOA amounted to 71 percent 
by value of total U.S. imports of textiles and clothing from SSA?83 Imports under 
AGOA using foreign fabrics amounted to 75 percent of AGOA clothing imports, while 
imports using regional fabric from U.S. or regional yarn accounted for a much smaller 
22 percent. 284 Less than 0.5 percent of the AGOA clothing shipments was made from 
U.S.-cut fabric and yarn.285 The largest AGOA suppliers included Lesotho (40 percent 
of AGOA clothing imports), Kenya (15 percent), Mauritius (13 percent), and 
Swaziland (9 percent). Mauritius and South Africa supplied 98 percent of AGOA 
clothing imports using regional fabrics. 286 
As pointed out by the ITC in its 2003 report on the post-ATC clothing and 
textile sector, "the availability of local or regional raw material greatly improves a 
country's ability to respond to orders with shorter lead times.,,287 In the Commission's 
view, "[a]s purchasers consolidate and rationalize their sources, the degree of vertical 
integration in countries or fIrms becomes an important competitiveness factor.,,288 It 
has been suggested that ATC quotas and tariffs reduce the demand for fIber cropS.289 
Consequently, "phasing out the MFA may be expected to have a favorable impact on 
fIber production by increasing the long-term demand for, and hence the price of, textile 
fIbers.,,29o It has been estimated that "the full liberalization of world trade in textile and 
clothing will boost cotton exports by 9 percent in sub-Saharan Africa (about US$132 
million)",291 but "full liberalization" means the elimination of all tariffs and domestic 
and export subsidies for cotton. ATC implementation standing alone is likely to have 
two distinct effects, however: "an output effect arising from increases in the volume of 
textile and clothing output and, hence, fIber input, and a substitution effect flowing 
from elimination of the distortions between fIbers created by the ATC.,,292 According 
to the ITC, "[f]or cotton producers, the substitution effect may be relatively large, since 
it has been reported that the ATC has imposed an im~licit tax of about 20 percent on 
cotton products relative to manmade-fIber products.,,29 
Given the labor costs, low productivity, long lead times, and high cost of other 
inputs compared with those in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa is not a particularly low-cost 
area for production of textiles and clothing, according to industry sources.294 Most 
companies located their production in sub-Saharan Africa because of quotas on other 
suppliers outside the region.295 These quotas on suppliers outside the SSA region, 
combined with duty-free, quota-free access to the European Union and, since October 
2000, to the U.S. market under AGOA, have led to increased exports of mainly 
clothing items from sub-Saharan Africa?96 Because of the importance of quotas for 
fIrms investing in the SSA region, it has been predicted that it will be diffIcult for sub-
Saharan Africa to compete in a quota-free world.297 EU and AGOA preferences may 
not be enough to keep the industry competitive except in the area of manmade-fiber 
and wool clothing, where sub-Saharan Africa is competitive and U.S. duties high on 
articles from outside the region that are made from those fIbers. 298 A number of SSA 
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companies have reported that they have lost sales in the EU market to countries such as 
Bangladesh, even with EU quotas in place.299 Most SSA firms view vertical integration 
as the means of survival in a quota-free world.3OO 
Companies in sub-Saharan Africa have indicated that both U.S. incentives 
under AGOA and the restrictiveness of U.S. quotas on imports of textiles and clothing 
from non-SSA sup~liers have provided a significant impetus for expanded exports to 
the United States.3 1 However, most companies pointed out that quotas on non-SSA 
suppliers was the most important factor that made it economical to locate textile and 
clothing production in SSA and to export from the region.302 Many companies stated 
that retailers were increasing their purchases of clothing from sub-Saharan Africa 
under AGOA because they do not have to pay duties.303 However, without quotas on 
non-SSA suppliers, the absence of duties likely would not retain SSA's 
competitiveness, except in cases where U.S. duties are relatively high, such as on 
products made from manmade fibers.304 
The importance of the U.S. market to sub-Saharan Africa has been stressed by 
a number of companies.305 Industry representatives noted that growth in EU imports of 
textiles and clothing from non-SSA suppliers, particularly Bangladesh, under the 
"Everything But Arms" initiative has made it difficult to compete in the EU market.306 
The companies have noted that the implementation of AGOA served to provide a new 
outlet for SSA clothing exports at about the same time that export sales to the 
European Union were starting to slump.307 
Sub-Saharan Africa has a number of disadvantages in terms of logistics and 
infrastructure. For example, buyers and companies in Mauritius have cited the long 
shipping time to the U.S. market as a significant disadvantage.308 Long shipping times 
affect not only transportation to the final market, but also the time required to complete 
an order, because many inputs, including fabrics and yarns, have to be imported.309 
Longer lead times mean that SSA products will be largely confined to "basics" that do 
not depend on quick changes in fashion.310 Unfortunately for SSA clothing 
manufacturers, these are also the types of products that can be groduced in China, 
India, Bangladesh and other Asian countries very competitively.3 1 SSA exports that 
are in basic products will be vulnerable to lower cost Asian production now that A TC 
quotas have been eliminated.312 
SSA companies interviewed by the ITC also noted that the competitiveness of 
the region's clothing industry is undermined by the limited availability and high cost of 
regional inputs, compared with those in countries such as China and India. Although 
sub-Saharan Africa has an important textile fiber base (mainly in cotton and wool) for 
the development of textile and clothing industries, many of the SSA countries that 
produce fibers have lacked the manufacturing investment required to use these fibers 
locally.313 In other words, the SSA clothing industry is not vertically integrated, with 
less value being added than would otherwise be the case if the industry were vertically 
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integrated. This makes rapid response to orders extremely difficult. To improve 
utilization of SSA cotton within the region, a number of SSA countries are 
participating in the Cotton Pipeline Project, whose purpose is to assist cotton 
production, increase the number of ginning mills, and improve the distribution of SSA 
cotton so as to expand textile and clothing industries within the region.314 
The ITC further reports that sub-Saharan Africa is a higher cost producer of 
cotton yam and fabrics than China and India.315 U.S. imports of clothing made from 
third-country fabrics amounted to 75 percent of AGOA clothing imports in 2002.316 
This reflects the high cost of U.S. fabrics in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the limited 
availability and relatively high cost of regional yams and fabrics. 317 In addition to cost 
differentials, concerns have been expressed about the small variety of fabrics that can 
be produced in sub-Saharan Africa compared with Asia.318 This lack of both 
diversification and vertical integration is considered an important disadvantage for the 
region, as buyers and fashion dictate the type of fabrics used.319 AGOA preferences 
have enabled sub-Saharan Africa to become more competitive in manmade-fiber 
clothing due to the relatively high duties on such clothing.32o However, because this 
industry is highly capital intensive, South Africa is the only country in the region 
producing synthetic filament yam.321 Another important disadvantage is the lack of 
capacity within SSA countries to produce the volume of clothing that can be produced 
in China and India.322 Many SSA companies expressed concern that as buyers reduce 
the number of countries from which they source following the termination of A TC 
quotas, sub-Saharan Africa will be a loser as buyers eliminate sourcing costs by 
purchasing from larger, vertically-integrated suppliers.323 
Companies operating in sub-Saharan Africa recognize that to be competitive 
they need to become vertically integrated and to offer full-service packages.324 In that 
connection, some companies in Mauritius and South Africa produce high-value added 
products, such as fully-fashioned sweaters in cotton, cashmere, lambs wool, and 
various blends, and clothing from wool and manmade fibers. 325 The ITC forecasts that 
it is highly likely that these countries will be competitive in these high-value products 
in the future. 326 Nevertheless, a number of investments are underway in SSA countries 
to increase the number of vertically integrated companies and to upgrade service 
packages, but these types of investments take time, as noted by the ITC. 327 Most 
companies interviewed by the ITC cited vertical integration as a way to compete in a 
quota-free world because it will cut lead times, assure fabric availability, and give a 
company more control and flexibility over its outpUt.328 
In short, on balance it appears that ATC termination will put the SSA clothing 
industry in a very difficult position. The potential impact that ATC termination will 
have on upstream suppliers of clothing inputs, mainly SSA cotton growers, is 
addressed next. 
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IV. MAKING U.S. AGRICULTURAL, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY FOR SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA MORE COHERENT 
Table 9 lists the top six SSA textile and clothing exporters to the United States 
and the volume of their exports to the United States in 2002/03 and 2003/04:329 
TABLE 9. Top SSA TEXTILE & CLOTHING EXPORTERS TO U.S. 
Total Textile & Kenya Lesotho Madagascar Mauritius South Swaziland 
Clothing Exports Africa 
(million square 
meter quivalents) 
Total Textile & 58.799 107.618 57.852 40.748 73.930 54.979 
Clothing Exports to 
U.S. for Year Ending 
5/2004 
Cotton Textile & 45.584 78.686 45.467 39.368 45.220 27.850 
Clothing Exports 
Year Ending 5/2004 
Man-Made Fiber 13.195 28.882 10.923 0.775 25.505 27.129 
Textile & Clothing 
Exports Year Ending 
5/2004 
Wool Textile & 13.195 0.027 1.446 0.438 3.055 0.000 
Clothing Exports 
Year Ending 5/2004 
Total Textile & 49.562 89.785 19.088 48.193 80.242 35.157 
Clothing Exports to 
U.S. for Year Ending 
512003 
Cotton Textile & 34.571 63.954 15.824 46.893 46.710 21.330 
Clothing Exports 
Year Ending 5/2003 
Man-Made Fiber 
Textile & Clothing 14.890 25.831 2.882 0.952 30.501 13.807 
Exports Year Ending 
5/2003 
Wool Textile & 0.003 0.000 0.289 0.297 2.965 0.000 
Clothing Exports 
Year Ending 512003 
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Percentage Change 
in Total U.S. Exports 18.64 19.86 203.09 -15.45 -7.87 56.38 
Between Year 
Ending 5/2003 and 
Year Ending 5/2004 
Percentage Share of 
U.S. Textile & .13 .25 .13 .09 .17 .13 
Clothing Imports for 
Year Ending 5/2004 
Source: U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Clothing 
With the exception of Swaziland (whose exports to the United States were evenly 
divided between roughly 50 percent of cotton and 50 percent of man-made fibers in 
2003), the largest percentage of exports to the United States from these major SSA 
textiles and clothing producers are made of cotton. Couple this fact with ATC 
termination and the lTC's and WTO's assessments that China and India are poised to 
dominate international trade in textiles and clothing, and one must wonder whether 
SSA cotton producers should be anything but deeply concerned about ATC 
termination. Does AGOA dangle any prospect for hope? 
One of AGOA's explicit goals was to encourage investment in the textile and 
clothing industry with its quota-free and duty-free rules on textile and clothing imports. 
AGOA preferences may spur U.S. firms to source products from the region that are 
subject to high U.S. duty rates, such as manmade fiber and wool clothing, particularly 
since the provision allowing for the use of third-country fabrics has been extended 
beyond 2004 to 2007. Some sourcing of basic garments made in the region from local 
fabrics, such as pants and knit tops, may also continue.33o But there is little in this 
forecast for optimism about the future of SSA cotton growers. For upstream producers 
of clothing inputs - mainly SSA cotton producers - the termination of the ATC may 
make their economic life even more marginal as markets for their crops within the SSA 
region shrink. If the heart of the U.S. government was in the right place when it 
renewed and extended AGOA and enacted the Millennium Challenge Act, was its 
head? Are AGOA and the MCA in the end nothing more than "empty rhetoric,,?331 Or 
is such criticism a case of hindsight always being 20/20? 
With the projected decline in U.S. clothing imports from sub-Saharan Africa 
resulting from ATC quota elimination, will the impact on SSA cotton growers be 
positive, negative, or neutral? Raw cotton is either a major agricultural product or a 
major export, or both, for 15 SSA countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, 
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Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.332 Table 10 identifies the primary 
export markets for these 15 SSA cotton producers in 2002: 
TABLE 10. MAJOR EXPORT MARKETS FOR SSA COTTON* 
Cotton Rank Order of 
Country Exports** Cotton Exports Major Cotton Export 
(US$million) Among All Markets 
Exports 
Benin $118.2 (2001) 1 India 38%, Brazil 9% 
Burkina Faso $72.1 1 Italy 26%, Colombia 14%, 
Cameroon $85.3 6 Thailand 23%, Germany 11 % 
Central African $6.9 (2001) 3 Belgium 70%, Taiwan 20% 
Rep. 
Chad $48.4 1 Portugal 37%, Germany 21 % 
Cote d'Ivoire $79 11 Indonesia 31 %, Thailand 16% 
Guinea-Bissau $2.7 5 Portugal 91 %, France 9% 
Mali $125.2 1 Thailand 25%, India 15% 
Mozambique $16 10 Portugal 48%, India 30% 
Sudan $55.2 6 Egypt 33% 
Tanzania $24.4 9 India 39%, Indonesia 10% 
Togo $26.4 3 Taiwan 38%, Thailand 12% 
Uganda $3.6 13 UK 23%, South Africa 20% 
Zambia $16.4 9 South Africa 90% 
Zimbabwe $116.4 6 South Africa 32%, Taiwan 
12% 
Source: International Trade Centre UNCTADIWTO database, available at 
http://www.intracen.org/menus/countries.htm. 
*Unless otherwise noted, all data is for 2002. 
**"Cotton" as classified under HS 5201, "cotton, not carded or combed." 
With the exceptions of Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, the 
remaining 11 nations are LDCs that, by definition, lack a diversified economy. If the 
major SSA textile and clothing producers experience a slump in global demand for 
their products as a result of A TC quota elimination - as the ITC and the WTO both 
predict - are the export markets of the SSA cotton-producing nations adequately 
diversified to weather a sharp decline in regional demand for cotton? Interestingly, as 
Table 10 illustrates, with the exceptions of Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe for which 
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South Africa is a significant export market, the major export markets for the other SSA 
cotton producers are primarily outside the region, chiefly markets in Europe and Asia, 
with only Benin, Mali, and Tanzania having large export markets in India. It would 
therefore seem that if the SSA clothing industry experiences a slump or collapse 
because of ATC quota elimination, the indirect impact on most SSA cotton growers 
will be minimal. For regional cotton growers who export to markets other than Africa, 
China, and India, the picture is less clear. There is a "good news, bad news" dimension 
to this analysis. The good news is that ATC termination probably will not have a 
serious impact on SSA cotton producers. The bad news is that intra-regional trade in 
cotton is not very high. 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the lTC's gloomy forecast for the clothing 
industry in countries other than China, India, and Pakistan, the USTR has reported that 
a number of Asian textile and clothing fmns have recently made additional 
investments in sub-Saharan Africa in the clothing and textile sector. 333 For example, in 
Namibia a subsidiary of a Malaysian textile producer invested over $200 million since 
April 2001, created 5,000 new jobs, and exported over $22 million in clothing products 
to the United States since initiating operations in June 2002.334 Two more clothing 
companies are in the process of beginning production. These fmns will add another 
$115 million in investment and over 6,000 additional jobs.335 In Lesotho a Taiwanese 
investor is building a $100 million denim rolling mill to supply local manufacturers.336 
That plant will employ 5,000 new workers when operational in 2004.337 The same 
investor has plans to invest an additional $50 million in a new yam spinning plant. 338 
Other Taiwanese investors will contribute an additional $10 million to build a separate 
weaving and dying factory.339 These facilities will be able to supply most of the denim 
and knit fabric needed by Lesotho's garment industry.340 In Mali a $12.5 million 
cotton-thread factory opened in February 2004.341 The facility is one of the few sub-
Saharan Africa plants outside South Africa capable of producing quality thread for use 
in manufacturing clothing for export under AGOA.342 The factory, the first of its kind 
in Mali, created a modest 200 new jobs.343 Finally, in Madagascar four international 
investors established a $10 million clothing manufacturer in 2003.344 
In its 2003 annual report on U.S. trade and investment in sub-Saharan Africa, 
the ITC likewise reported that in 2001 and 2002 foreign investment continued to flow 
into the region in the clothing and textile sector, including in Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, and 
Uganda.345 It would seem that those investors who are continuing to pour money into 
the SSA textile and clothing sector have taken a clearly contrarian position to that of 
the ITC regarding the future dominance of China, India, and Pakistan in the textile and 
clothing industry. Unless there is some serious market failure at work here, these 
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investors obviously believe that sub-Saharan Africa still has a future in the clothin~ 
and textile sector even after January 1, 2005, when the ATC was fully implemented.34 
Against this backdrop, are U.S. agricultural policy, on the one hand, and U.S. 
trade and development policy for sub-Saharan Africa, on the other, working at cross-
purposes? Do they lack coherence? As noted above, cotton plays a critical role in the 
economies of several SSA countries, particularly in the West and Central African 
nations of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali. Yet, U.S. cotton subsidies are 
undermining efforts to improve the lives of people living in these WCA countries. 
Thus, U.S. domestic agricultural policy is undercutting U.S. trade and development 
policy for sub-Saharan Africa because domestic and export subsidies to U.S. cotton 
producers are harming a group of intended beneficiaries under AGOA and the MCA, 
namely, SSA cotton producers. 
Not only is U.S. agricultural policy undercutting U.S. trade and development 
policy for sub-Saharan Africa, but the full implementation of the ATC at the end of 
2004 would appear to be unwelcome news for textile and clothing suppliers in 
countries other than China and India as well. As the ITC has reported, with the 
termination of the ATC the SSA region's overall share of U.S. clothing imports will 
fall, notwithstanding AGOA preferences. 
Yet, having made this criticism, let me state a time-worn maxim that is 
frequently used in the international context: "Don't let the best be the enemy of the 
good." In other words, if a perfect result is the standard, then nothing will ever be 
accomplished because such an impossibly high standard is unattainable. Nothing in 
human affairs, including the most well-intentioned efforts of governments, is ever 
perfect. It is easy to "Monday morning quarterback" the efforts of countries that seek 
to make the world a better place by assisting the most disadvantaged. Should it tum out 
in the end that AGOA's textile and clothing provisions .are a case of too little, too late, 
one must remember that no trade and development program will be without its flaws, 
whether by design or accident. So, rather than bash AGOA and the MCA, let me 
instead focus on what I view as a significant programmatic flaw: the arguably 
unintended consequences of agricultural subsidies and their impact on cotton farmers 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Before turning to a consideration of these two exogenous 
factors that may impede development in sub-Saharan Africa, I would like to first 
examine endogenous factors in the region that may be hampering economic progress 
and thus require reform. 
As has been noted previously in this paper, many studies have fingered cotton 
subsidies to cotton producers in the United States, China, and the European Union as 
the villain responsible for the plight of SSA cotton farmers. However, it also has been 
suggested that what is really needed are internal reforms within the cotton producing 
nations of sub-Saharan Africa, coupled with external reforms in the provision of 
subsidies to cotton growers in other parts of the world.347 Regarding internal reform 
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initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa where cotton is an important crop, during the 1990s 
several African countries undertook internal market reforms. For example, Uganda 
carried out successful cotton reforms. Cotton production tripled during the eight-year 
period beginning in 1995/96, with farmers' share in the sale of cotton on world 
markets also increasing by 25 percent.348 Zimbabwe, on the other hand, initiated cotton 
reforms in the 1990s, but political and macroeconomic instability in the country, as 
well as insecurity over land tenure - factors belond the sector's control - have hurt 
cotton production and the economy as a whole.34 
In West and Central Africa, the story is more mixed. Cotton production has 
increased fourfold over the past 25 years, making the region the world's second largest 
cotton exporter with an almost 15-percent share of world exports.350 West and Central 
Africa produces high yields and consistently high-quality cotton, but the prices that 
WCA producers receive tend to be low. Explanations for the low prices include several 
internal factors. First, government taxes on cotton producers are used to subsidize 
domestic textile firms through low prices for cotton inputs.351 Second, cotton is bought 
and sold by parastatal companies that operate without competition.352 Third, cotton is 
priced uniformly throughout the region without regard to the location of farmers 
relative to ginning or distribution centers, thus in effect transferring resources from one 
group of farmers to another.353 
To correct these internal market inefficiencies, the World Bank has proposed, 
inter alia, that the WCA countries permit free entry into the cotton market at all levels, 
thus linking domestic grices to world prices.354 In addition, national cotton companies 
should be privatized? Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo have opened their cotton sector 
to private ginners.356 Benin and Cote d'Ivoire have also eliminated the monopoly 
power of national comganies and have transferred some of the former's responsibilities 
to the private sector. 7 Similar reforms are underway, but not yet completed, in 
Burkina Fas0358 and Mali.359 
But despite these reform efforts, with the exception of South Africa, no SSA 
country has a diversified economy. The region has been and continues to be heavily 
dependent upon primary products for their export earnings.36o As UNCT AD notes, 
More than for any other developing region, Africa's heavy dependence 
on primary commodities as a source of export earnings has meant that 
the continent remains vulnerable to market vagaries and weather 
conditions. Price volatility, arising mainly from supply shocks and the 
secular decline in real commodity prices, and the attendant terms-of-
trade losses have exacted heavy costs in terms of incomes, 
indebtedness, investment, poverty and development.361 
351 
HeinOnline -- 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 352 2004-2005
Kennedy 
While the structure of most developing countries' exports has shifted to 
manufacturing (about 70 percent), in the case of Africa that number is closer to 30 
percent, a mere lO-percentage point increase over the two decades from 1980 to 
2000.362 As noted above, farming dominates the economies of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Lack of export diversification is clearly a problem for the region. Still, when it comes 
to cotton, UNCT AD is quick to point out that the chief difficulty that SSA cotton 
producers face in world markets is an exogenous one: 
The loss of market shares for cotton and sugar is largely the result of 
high subsidies and domestic support for less competitive producers in 
the United States and Europe. The United States is the world's largest 
exporter of cotton thanks to huge cotton subsidies, which in 2001-2002 
amounted to $3.9 billion, double the level in 1992 and $1 billion more 
than the value of total United States cotton production during the season 
at world market prices.363 
Sub-Saharan Africa faces many complex problems, and complex problems 
generally call for complex solutions. However, in the case of cotton, the plight of the 
region's cotton producers seems to beg for an economically simple solution, but 
unfortunately one that is politically complex: the elimination of government subsidies 
to cotton producers in other parts of the world and the creation of an interim 
mechanism to compensate SSA cotton producers for lost income until all government 
subsidies to cotton producers are phased OUt.364 UNCTAD concludes that "the proposal 
submitted by African producers to the WTO for compensation for income losses 
suffered by their cotton producers appears to be the only means by which poor 
producers could have some relief in the short to medium term.,,365 
What are the prospects for subsidies reform by the world's major cotton 
producers? Multilateral negotiations on the elimination of agricultural subsidies 
requires excellent problem-solving skills, invoking the art of the possible. The 
complete elimination of both domestic and export subsidies seems unlikely, although 
in August 2004 WTO members pledged to eliminate export subsidies on all 
agricultural products "by a credible end date". 366 Because export subsidies are deemed 
to be per se trade distorting, they have been prohibited for all developing countries 
since 1995 and for developing countries since 2003 on all non-agricultural trade under 
Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.367 Extending 
this prohibition to agricultural trade is the logical, although admittedly politically 
difficult, next step. 
With regard to domestic subsidies, perhaps the best near-term solution for 
WCA cotton producers is for subsidizing nations to move to a system of truly 
decoupled support (that is, support that is not tied to production in any respect) rather 
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than price support. As the WTO panel in the United States - Subsidies on Upland 
Cotton ruled, in order to qualify as an exemft green box subsidy, decoupled support 
can have absolutely no ties to production.36 In other words, all decoupled domestic 
support must comply with the criteria for exempt ~een box subsidies set out in Annex 
2, paragraph 6, of the Agreement on Agriculture. 69 However, in order for decoupled 
support to work in a less market distorting way than it currently does, such support 
schemes must have the following features. First, in order to ensure that production is 
not encouraged because of government subsidies, decoupled support has to be the only 
form of farm support. Likewise, the condition that land stay in agriculture as a 
condition for receipt of decoupled support should be eliminated because it only serves 
to encourage production.37o In other words, the amber box and blue box categories of 
farm support that are tied either to price or production, as well as de minimis subsidies, 
must be eliminated. Second, just as quotas on textile and clothing imports were 
gradually phased out over a ten-year period under the ATC, so too all domestic 
subsidies in the form of decoupled support must be progressively phased out over a 
reasonable period of time. However, the August 1,2004 decision by the WTO General 
Council neither identifies a timeframe for implementing agricultural subsidy reduction 
commitments nor calls for the elimination of domestic subsidies. 
It has been proposed that an approach to the phasing-out of subsidies would be 
to eliminate subsidies on the goods shipped to specific groups of countries. Thus, 
France has suggested eliminating export subsidies on all goods that are destined for 
Africa. 371 The French proposal has at least one serious flaw in that it is likely to 
introduce a perverse dual price structure, with a low ~rice for non-African countries 
and a relatively high price for African countries.3 2 In the case of food, it is 
questionable whether this two-tiered system could be maintained in reality because 
African countries would be encouraged to import European agricultural products 
through third countries rather than from the European Union directly.373 In the case of 
cotton exports, moreover, WCA cotton producers would still be competing with low-
priced cotton on world markets. In order to encourage agricultural production in 
developing countries, it appears much more reasonable to promote a phasing-out of 
support that concentrates on a gradual reduction of support to all countries at the same 
time, as is contemplated in the framework agreement on agriculture negotiations 
concluded at the WTO in July 2004.374 Nevertheless, the process might start by 
focusing on strategic agricultural goods that are of particular importance to the poorest 
developing countries, such as cotton in sub-Saharan Africa.375 
Another suggestion would be for the European Union and the United States to 
agree to a coordinated, collaborative trade and development program for sub-Saharan 
Africa. As the region's first and second trading partners, together accounting for more 
than half of all trade with the region, and as the world's top economic powers, the 
European Union and the United States are perfectly placed to influence the course of 
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sub-Saharan Africa through a coordinated trade, aid, and development program for the 
region. It is time to end the rivalry and instead to join forces for the good of the 
world's poorest nations. 
Besides a coordinated external effort by the European Union and the United 
States, a parallel internal effort at coordination should be undertaken by th~ region. 
Only 10 percent of African trade is with other African nations, leaving a fragmented 
market that cannot achieve economies of scale and thus making the region less 
attractive as a destination for foreign investment.376 Underscoring this point, UNCTAD 
observes that "the full potential of intra-African trade has yet to be fully exploited 
through greater coordination of efforts aimed at harmonizing customs procedures and 
reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and at improving transport and communications 
links through greater investment in developing regional infrastructure.,,377 For this 
reason it has been further suggested that the key to sub-Saharan Africa becoming a 
significant player in the global economy is for SSA countries to form a regional trading 
bloc.378 Within the region there currently exist nine major free trade areas and customs 
unions: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (W AEMU); the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC); the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); the East African Community 
(EAC); the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the Indian Ocean 
Commission (IOC); and the Communaute Economique et Monetaire de l' Afrique 
Centrale (CEMAC).379 The 52-member African Union, the successor to the 
Organization of African Unity, was launched in July 2002, together with the African 
Economic Community, with lofty ambitions to become an African-version of the 
European Union, i.e., EU-like institutions (a parliament, court of justice, and central 
bank) and a common currency.380 However, the record of existing SSA free trade areas 
and customs unions in integrating the economies of their member states is at best 
mixed.381 Based on the region's choppy experience with free trade areas and customs 
unions, the suggestion to create a pan-SSA trading bloc, whether in the form of a free 
trade area or a customs union, is extremely problematic. Consequently, whether bigger 
is better in the case of regional economic integration in sub-Saharan Africa is 
debatable. 
Finally, UNCTAD has suggested that the phasing out of agricultural support 
should coincide with increased international financial and technical assistance to 
agriCUlture in the LDCs to promote agricultural productivity growth and 
commercialization.382 UNCTAD observes that in 2001 government payments to 
farmers in OECD countries was actually seven times the level of total official 
development assistance (ODA) to the LDCs.383 In 2001 net flows of ODA to LDCs 
would have doubled if just 14 percent of the 2001 value of government payments to 
OECD agricultural producers had been redirected in aid to the LDCs.384 There is thus 
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an opportunity for major poverty reduction benefits through not only phasing out of 
agricultural support but also increasing international assistance to promote agricultural 
development in the LDCs. 
Of course, none of these suggestions addresses the impact of A TC termination 
on demand for SSA cotton by SSA clothing manufacturers. For cotton growers in West 
and Central Africa and other parts of the region whose primary export market for their 
product is Asia, A TC termination may be a blessing for them if the termination in fact 
results in increased cotton textile and clothing production in their export markets. Even 
in those SSA countries that sell their cotton to regional textile and clothing firms (e.g., 
Zambia's sales of cotton to South Africa), it may be the case that with the recent 
foreign direct investment activity in the region in the textile and clothing industry, that 
the lTC's and WTO's predicted demise of the SSA clothing industry may be greatly 
exaggerated. On the other hand, if the lTC's and WTO's predictions prove accurate, 
and should demand for SSA cotton decline as a result of ATC termination, then SSA 
cotton growers who currently sell primarily to SSA ginning and textile mills will have 
to adjust to the new market realities by finding alternative markets in Asia. 
What does seem clear is that any future amendments to the textile and clothing 
provisions of AGOA will do little, if anything, to mitigate the impact of ATC 
termination on the region. Even now the quota-fill rate for SSA clothing exports under 
the regional fabric and third-country fabric provisions of AGOA (the latter being the 
most liberal textile and clothing rule of origin that exists under U.S. law) has 
consistently been less thanlOO percent.385 
Before concluding, let me add to my list of five developments in 2004 a sixth 
that could deal a mortal blow to AGOA and that could in turn have a further negative 
impact on sub-Saharan Africa: Appellate Body's decision in April, 2004 in European 
Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing 
Countries?86 The significance of this Appellate Body report for AGOA beneficiary 
countries is not yet clear, but AGO A itself may very well be unlawful under the 
Enabling Clause,387 as interpreted by the Appellate Body. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Considering the heavy economic dependency of sub-Saharan Africa on 
agriculture, AGOA's explicit goal of moving the SSA workforce into the textile and 
clothing sector is laudable. Economic diversification is an important step toward 
poverty reduction. Unfortunately, AGOA may be diversifying the SSA economy and 
moving its workforce into a sunset industry. At the same time, U.S. agricultural policy 
is unintentionally punishing SSA cotton growers. SSA cotton producers, who are 
internationally competitive, are hobbled when it comes to effectively competing in 
international markets largely due to a single but formidable exogenous factor: a 
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subsidies-distorted international market for cotton. The WCA countries' chief 
competitors in international markets - China and the United States - subsidize their 
cotton growers up to 20 percent and 50 percent of world prices, respectively.388 
Elimination of cotton subsidies in China, the European Union, and the United States -
especially in China and the United States, the world's two largest producers and, in the 
case of the United States, the world's top exporter -- would lead to a reallocation of 
production to lower cost producers, including those in West and Central Africa. The 
latter in tum would experience increased income and a resulting reduction in poverty 
in what is the poorest region of the world.389 
With the Doha Round negotiations on agricultural subsidies and market access 
having been resusCitated, and with reform pressure building as a result of the WTO 
dispute settlement reports on U.S. cotton and EU sugar subsidies, the hurdle of 
eliminating cotton subsidies is not insurmountable. In fact, assuming the Appellate 
Body affIrms both panel reports in the U.S. cotton and EU sugar subsidies cases 
(which I do not assume to be a foregone conclusion), and further assuming that both 
the United States and the European Union take the full 12-15 months to bring their 
nonconforming laws into WTO compliance, it will be sometime in 2006 at the earliest 
before the WTO dispute settlement process has run its full course in these cases. 
Fortuitously, this happens to coincide with the projected timeframe for completing the 
Doha Round negotiations, and the 2002 Farm Act also will be nearing its 2007 
expiration date. In short, the stars may be aligned in 2006 for an agreement on 
meaningful reforms of agricultural subsidies. The timing could not be better for sub-
Saharan Africa and for U.S. taxpayers. In the meantime, Article 7.8 of the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures directs that "the Members granting or 
maintaining such subsidy [Le., domestic subsidies that cause adverse effects to the 
interests of other WTO members in third-country markets] shall take appropriate steps 
to remove the adverse effects [e.g., pay compensation] or shall withdraw the 
subsidy.,,39o Therefore, until such time as U.S. cotton subsidies that have been found to 
be in violation of the SCM Agreement are removed, SSA cotton growers who are 
injured as a result of those subsidies should receive compensation measured by lost 
income and lost profits on sales to their export markets. 
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See id. 
74. See Oxfam Cotton Study, supra note 40, at 15. 
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threatens to lead to, circumvention of a Member's commitment under Article 3.3 not to provide 
listed export subsidies in respect of such an unscheduled product." See United States -
Subsidies on Upland Cotton, supra note 5, <JI<JI 7.666-7.667. In the view of the WTO panel, 
insofar as Step 2 payments are made to exporters, such payments are thus prohibited subsidies: 
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[T]he measure specifically and explicitly targets eligible exporters - persons who are "regularly 
engaged" in exporting upland cotton - as a defined class of recipient for a defined, discrete, 
segment of the payments for a single eligible product. No one else is eligible to receive such 
payments. The only way to receive such payments is to be an eligible exporter exporting 
eligible (i.e. domestically produced) upland cotton. This United States upland cotton must be 
exported outside the United States, traversing the United States border. The measure at issue is, 
therefore contingent, or conditional upon, exportation. 
We therefore find that section 1207(a) of the FSRI Act of 2002 providing for 
user marketing (Step 2) payments to exporters constitutes a subsidy "contingent 
on export performance" within the meaning of Article 9.1(a) of the Agreement 
on Agriculture. 
[d. at «JI'II 7.736, 7.748 (emphasis in original). In connection with subsidies to domestic users of 
cotton, the WTO panel also found the Step 2 program to be a prohibited import substitution 
subsidy. See id. at 'II 7.1088. Other features of the U.S. farm program that assist cotton 
producers include crop insurance, cottonseed payments, and export credit guarantee measures. 
See United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton. supra note 5, at «Jl'II 7 .227 -7.249. 
76. See U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Farm Policy, Title III - Trade, at 
http://www.ers.usda.govlFeatures/farmbillltitles/titleIlItrade.htm (last visited August 12, 
2004). 
77. See United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, supra note 5, at «JI 7.869. 
78. See Baffes, supra note 20, at 37, Table 2. The WTP panel in United States - Subsidies on 
Upland Cotton, found domestic subsidies to cotton (i.e., excluding export subsidies) to equal 
$3.4 billion for the 1999 marketing year, $2.43 billion for the 2000 marketing year, $4.14 
billion for the 2001 marketing year, and $3.14 billion for the 2002 marketing year. See United 
States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, supra note 5, «JI 7.596, Table 2. 
79. See Oxfam Cotton Study, supra note 40, at 12; Baffes, supra note 20, at 13. As noted by the 
WTO panel: 
[W]e find credible evidence on the record concerning the divergence between 
United States producers' total costs of production and revenue from sales of 
upland cotton since 1997. This supports the proposition that United States 
upland cotton producers would not have been economically capable of 
remaining in the production of upland cotton had it not been for the United 
States subsidies at issue and that the effect of the subsidies was to allow United 
States producers to sell upland cotton at a price lower than would otherwise 
have been necessary to cover their total costs .... 
We believe that the existence of this gap between upland cotton producers' total 
production costs and market revenue, on the one hand, and the effect of the 
subsidies, on the other hand, was to sustain a higher level of output than would 
have occurred in the absence of the United States subsidies at issue. 
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United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, supra note 5, H 7.1353-7.1354 (footnotes 
omitted). 
80. Baffes, supra note 20, at 13. The United States is not the sole free market "sinner" in this 
regard. China, the EU, and Uzbekistan also subsidize their cotton producers. See id. at 13-16. 
81. Oxfam Cotton Study, supra note 40, at 23,33. 
82. See id. at 12 ("Historically, the cotton sector has received proportionally more support than 
most other commodities"). The same is true in the EU, where the amount of cotton subsidies 
are three to four times greater than those bestowed on corn on a per hectare basis, and seven to 
eight times greater than cereals subsidies. See Cotton Sector Strategies in West and Central 
Africa, supra note 29, at 5. Nevertheless, the impact of EU subsidies on global markets is 
muted by its low production volume. See id. See also Tables 2 & 4, supra. 
83. See UNCTAD LDC REPORT 2004, supra note 12, at 321, Annex, Table 1. 
84. See Oxfam Cotton Study, supra note 40, at 17, 31. Oxfam estimates that trade losses have 
amounted to 1.4 percent of GDP for Benin, 1.7 percent for Mali, and 1 percent for Burkina 
Faso. See id. at 17. 
85. See Joint Proposal, supra note 9, at 3-4, paras. 17-19. 
86. See id. at 4, para. 20. 
87. See Cotton Sector Strategies in West and Central Africa, supra note 29, at 13. 
88. See Joint Proposal, supra note 9, at 4, para. 24. 
89. [d. 
90. [d. Other studies show that the removal of production and export subsidies by the United 
States and the EU would result in cotton prices 10.7 to 12.7 percent higher than in 2001/02, 
with the biggest beneficiaries being African cotton producers. See Baffes, supra note 20, at 19. 
91. See Cotton Sector Strategies in West and Central Africa, supra note 29, at 13. An Oxfam study 
estimates that African producers lost foreign exchange earnings of $302 million. Oxfam 
estimates forgone foreign exchange earnings for the following SSA countries: Benin, $33 
million; Burkina Faso, $28 million; Chad, $16 million; the Central African Republic, $2 
million; Ethiopia, $5 million; Guinea, $3 million; Madagascar, $3 million; Malawi, $2 million; 
Mali, $43 million; Mozambique, $6 million; Somalia, $1 million; Sudan, $17 million; Togo, 
$16 million; Uganda, $5 million; Tanzania, $21 million; and Zambia, $8 million. See Oxfam 
Cotton Study, supra note 40, at 31. 
92. See UNCT AD LDC REpORT 2004, supra note 12, at 224. Some estimates show that over the 
next 10 years "cotton prices would increase by an average of 12.7 per cent. World cotton trade 
would increase by 5.8 per cent, while Africa's cotton exports would increase by 12.6 per cent. 
See id. 
93. See WTO, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 14 
November 2001, WTIMIN(Ol)/DEC/l (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial 
Declaration] (deliberately avoiding the word "Round" in order to disassociate it at least 
verbally from the seemingly interminable, eight-year Uruguay Round). 
94. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 93, at 3, para. 13. 
95. The trade ministers made the following commitment regarding progress on negotiations on 
trade in agriculture: 
Modalities for the further commitments, including provisions for special and 
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differential treatment, shall be established no later than 31 March 2003. 
Participants shall submit their comprehensive draft Schedules based on these 
modalities no later than the date of the Fifth Session of the Ministerial 
Conference. The negotiations, including with respect to rules and disciplines 
and related legal texts, shall be concluded as part and at the date of conclusion 
of the negotiating agenda as a whole. 
Id. at 3, para. 14. 
96. See Joint Proposal, supra note 9. 
97. See WTO, Agriculture Negotiations: Backgrounder, The Issues, and where we are now, at 69 
(2004), at http://www.wto.orglenglishltratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd2030tton_e.htm (last 
visited August 15, 2004). See also, WTO, ANNuAL REPORT 2004 10-14 (2004), available at 
http://www.wto.orglenglishlres3/reser3/annual_reporce.htm. The Cotton Initiative received 
support from an unlikely ally, the International Rayon and Synthetic Fibres Committee. It is 
reported that the Director General of that Committee complained in July 2003 that cotton 
subsidies have depressed demand for substitute synthetic fibers, resulting in underutilization of 
capacity and frustrating legitimate expectations that man-made fibers would enjoy competitive 
advantages over cotton. See Baffes, supra note 20, at viii. 
98. See Joint Proposal, supra note 9, at 1, paras. 2-3. For more on the internal reform initiatives 
undertaken by West and Central African nations, see Baffes, supra note 20, at 25-28. 
99. See Joint Proposal, supra note 9, at 1, para. 4. See also INT'L COTTON ADVISORY COMMITTEE, 
REpORTS ON INJURY DUE TO Low COTTON PRICES 2 (2002)(" The level of injury caused to 
[cotton] producers and export dependent countries by the collapse of cotton prices is severe .... 
[T]he dominant cause of current low prices seems to be government measures affecting cotton 
production and trade. The most recent report by the Secretariat, Production and Trade Policies 
Affecting the Cotton Industry, suggests that a removal of direct subsidies worldwide would 
have a net positive effect of 31 cents per pound oflint on average cotton prices in 2001102."). 
100. See Joint Proposal, supra note 9, at 2, para. 8. As they further observed in this connection: 
The elimination of subsidies for cotton production and export is the only 
specific interest of WCA cotton-producing countries in the Doha Round. Any 
outcome of the negotiations that does not help to ensure respect for the 
principles of free trade and competition in global trade in cotton will be seen by 
the WCA countries as unbalanced, unfair and contrary to the objectives 
approved by all the Member countries at Doha. Id. 
101. Id. at 2, para. 6. 
102. Id. at 2, para. 7 (emphasis in original). 
103. See id. at 7, para. 38 ("the form of financial compensation for cotton-producing LDCs [shall be 
in an amount sufficient] to offset the injury caused by support for production and export. Such 
financial compensation should be calculated in proportion to the subsidies granted by countries 
which support their cotton production. It will decrease (terminate) as and when these subsidies 
are reduced (abolished)."). The Joint Proposal offered the following specifics on calculating the 
amount of compensation, including compensation for the indirect harm caused to persons 
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dependent upon cotton but who are not themselves cotton growers (e.g., the transportation 
sector and ginning operations): 
• When defining the total amount of compensation, the direct and indirect 
effects of support for cotton production on the economies of LDCs should be 
taken into account. 
• The compensation should be sufficiently high to constitute an additional 
incentive to decrease or phase out subsidies as soon as possible. 
• The unit amount and the total amount of subsidies should be taken into 
account when dividing the compensation among countries which subsidize 
production. 
Id. at 7, para. 39. The specific modalities for implementing the elimination of cotton subsidies 
and transitional compensation were proposed in a later document. See WTO, Ministerial 
Conference, Fifth Session, Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton, Joint 
Proposal by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, Proposal on Implementation Modalities, 
TN/AG/GEN/6 (Aug. 4, 2003). Subsidies would be eliminated in equal annual reductions over 
a three-year period. Compensation would be paid in an amount equal to the losses suffered; 
assessed on the basis of subsidizing countries' respective shares in the total amount of 
subsidies granted to cotton worldwide, as published in the annual statistics of the International 
Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC); and allocated to each beneficiary LDC on the basis of its 
respective share in total cotton production by that group of countries, as published in the ICAC 
annual statistics. See id. at 2,3, paras. 7, 17. 
104. The Joint Proposal explains why these traditional forms of WTO compensation are 
inappropriate under the circumstances, 
In principle, compensation in the WTO is through two instruments. First of all, 
supplementary concessions are offered for other products. This mechanism 
cannot apply to cotton-producing LDCs because they only have a few other 
export products and, in most cases, these already receive preferential access. 
Secondly, customs tariffs are increased on imports. The signatory countries are 
not in favour of this solution because it rights a wrong through another wrong. 
In addition, this solution has a greater impact on countries which impose such 
customs tariffs inasmuch as the majority of their imports are essential for 
development and poverty reduction. These two instruments are therefore 
counterproductive for cotton-producing LDCs. 
Joint Proposal, supra note 9, at 7, para. 37. 
105. See WTO, Ministerial Conference, Fifth Session, Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in 
Favour of Cotton, Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, WTIMIN(03)/w12 
(Aug. 15, 2003). 
106. See Agriculture Negotiations: Backgrounder, Cotton Initiative, supra note 97. 
107. See id. 
108. Paragraph 27 of the Draft Cancun Ministeria~ Text (also known as the "Derbez Text" after the 
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chair of the Fifth Ministerial Conference) provides: 
We recognise the importance of cotton for the development of a number of developing 
countries and understand the need for urgent action to address trade distortions in these 
markets. Accordingly, we instruct the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee to 
consult with the Chairpersons of the Negotiating Groups on Agriculture, Non-Agricultural 
Market Access and Rules to address the impact of the distortions that exist in the trade of 
cotton, man-made fibres, textiles and clothing to ensure comprehensive consideration of the 
entirety of the sector. The Director-General is instructed to consult with the relevant 
international organizations including the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization and the International Trade Centre to effectively direct existing programmes and 
resources toward diversification of the economies where cotton accounts for the major share of 
their GDP. Members pledge to refrain from utilizing their discretion within Annex A, 
paragraph 1 to avoid making reductions in domestic support for cotton. 
World Trade Organization, Draft Cancun Ministerial Text, para. 27 (2d rev., Sept. 13, 2003), 
available at http://www.wto.orglenglishlthewto_e/minisce/min03_e/drafcdecLrev2_e.htm 
(last visited August 15, 2004). 
109. See generally Cancun Ministerial Collapses Over Singapore Issues, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Sept. 
15,2003). 
110. See WTO African Regional Workshop on Cotton, Cotonou, Republic of Benin-23-24 March 
2004, Summary Conclusions, WTIIJ564 (March 31, 2004). 
111. See id. at 3, paras. 7-11. 
112. See ;d. at 3, para. 11. 
113. See id. at 5. 
114. See id. at 4-5. 
115. See, e.g., WTO Members Make No Progress on Agriculture Ahead of Ministers Meeting, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE (July 26, 2004); WTO Ag Draft May Have to be Further Weakened to Achieve 
Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July 23, 2004); Food Importers Offer Little, But Are Unlikely to 
Block WTO Farm Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July 9, 2004). The United States and the EU 
squared off with their most contentious rivals, the G20 group of developing countries. Some 
minor grousing also was directed at them by the G 1 0 group of net food importers. See id. The 
G-20, led by Brazil and India, consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, 
Thailand, Tanzania, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. The G 10 consists of Bulgaria, Iceland, Israel, 
Japan, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, and Taiwan. 
116. See Overall WTO Framework Delayed as Fears Grow Over G90 Objections, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (July 9, 2004)(,'The four West African countries, Benin, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso, 
are all G90 members, and last week none of the four signaled explicitly that they could accept 
cotton being discussed in the context of agriculture."). 
117. See WTOACP Ministerial Declaration on the Doha Work Programme, Communication from 
Trinidad and Tobago, WT1IJ578, at 6, para. 17 (July 26, 2004) ("Cotton continues to be a vital 
issue for ACP [African, Caribbean, and Pacific] States and requires an urgent solution. In this 
regard, the ACP States underscore that it should be treated as a stand-alone issue and not as a 
part of the overall negotiations on agriculture."); G90 Maintains Tough Line on Cotton, 
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Otherwise Signals Flexibility, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July 16, 2004). The G90 consists of 
members of the African Union, the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, 
and the WTO's least developed countries. See generally G90 Takes Hard Public Line on Doha 
Talks, But Observers Predict Flexibility, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (June 25, 2004). 
118. See generally G90 Maintains Tough Line on Cotton, Otherwise Signals Flexibility, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (July 16, 2004)("A developed country delegation source acknowledged cotton would 
appear to be the most difficult of the G90's demands to address considering U.S. opposition to 
considering cotton on its own."). 
119. See generally G90 Takes Hard Public Line on Doha Talks, But Observers Predict Flexibility, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (June 25, 2004)(,'The U.S., EU and most other WTO members, as well as 
WTO Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi, have called on African countries to agree to 
negotiate cotton within the context of the agriculture negotiations, and have worked to prevent 
cotton from contributing to a failure in July similar to last year's Cancun ministerial."). 
120. See id. ("A Geneva delegation source outside the G90 said African countries do not want to be 
seen as blocking a framework agreement over the issue of cotton, particularly since a WTO 
panel ruled this spring in favor of Brazil's challenge of U.S. cotton subsidies ... "). 
121. See Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, supra note 4. 
122. See id. at A-I, Annex A, Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture. 
123. See id. at 1, para. l(b). 
124. See NCC Has Concerns with WTO Framework Text, available at http://www. 
cotton.orginewsI2004IWTORESPONSE.cfm (last visited August 16, 2004)("NCC President 
and CEO Mark Lange added that 'singling out cotton as a separate issue is both unfair and 
inappropriate. Unfortunately, this initiative has been influenced by poor economic analysis. 
Particular emphasis on U.S. cotton is unjustified and unwarranted - the world cotton market is 
much more than the United States. The U.S. has not increased cotton production, but we have 
seen a surge in foreign production, particularly in China and Brazil."'); U.S., African Deal on 
Cotton Included in WTO Framework Package, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Aug. 6, 2004)(,'The 
National Cotton Council criticized the agreement in an Aug. 2 statement as singling out cotton 
for special treatment ... "); U.S., African Countries Strike Deal on Cotton Language, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE (July 30, 2004); Thomas Calls on U.S. to Reject Demands for Cotton Concessions, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July 30, 2004). Interestingly, a provision was included in the Morocco-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement that exempts 1,067,257 kilograms of SSA cotton annually from the 
normal "fiber-forward" rule of origin that is applied to cotton textiles and clothing from 
Morocco (i.e., in order to be of Moroccan origin the fiber from which cotton yarn or thread is 
produced normally must also be from cotton grown in Morocco or the United States). See 
Final Text of United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, art. 4.3, !j[ 15, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assetslTrade_AgreementslBilateral/Morocco_FT AlFInal_textiassecuploa 
d_file837_3828.pdf. (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). Such cotton must originate in an SSA LDC 
that is an AGOA beneficiary country and the cotton must be carded or combed. The U.S. cotton 
industry did not object to this modest exemption. See Morocco FTA Seeks to Boost Cotton 
Exports from Sub-Saharan Africa, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (April 9, 2004). This exemption 
guarantees neither a Moroccan market nor huge profits. 
125. See U.S., African Deal on Cotton Included in WTO Framework Package, INSIDE U.S. TRADE 
(Aug. 6, 2004)("The agreement also does not commit the U.S. to any additional commitments 
on cotton above what it will do for other crops, [Chief U.S. Agriculture Negotiator Allen] 
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Johnson said."). The cotton sub-committee was formally established on Novermber 19, 2004. 
See WTO Establishes Cotton Subcommittee for Agriculture Talks, WTO NEWS: 2004 News 
Items, Nov. 19,2004. 
126. See Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, supra note 4, at 4, para. 3. 
Indeed, the next Ministerial Conference (the occasion for "inking" the deal, if any, or at least 
wrapping up the negotiations) is not scheduled until December 2005 in Hong Kong. See id.; 
Jara Highlights Possible Goals, Hurdles for Hong Kong Ministerial, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Oct. 
22,2004). 
127. See WTO Reaches Framework Deal, Sets New Ministerial Past Original Doha Deadline, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE (Aug. 1,2004). 
128. William R Cline, The Future of World Trade in Textiles and Clothing 145 (1987). 
129. Id. at 146. 
130. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 64, at 1217. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. 
133. Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, July 21, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 1675. 
134. Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, Feb. 9, 1962, 13 
U.S.T. 2673; extended by Protocol, May 1, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 1337; extended by Protocol, June 
15, 1970,21 U.S.T. 1970. 
135. Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001. For a 
history of trade in textiles and clothing in the 20th century, see GENERAL AGREEMENT ON 
TARIFFS AND TRADE, TEXTILES AND CLOTHING IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 5, 62-65 (1984). 
136. The Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) was renewed with modifications for four years in 1977, 
see Protocol Extending the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 14, 
1977, 29 U.S.T. 2287; for four and a half years in 1981, see Protocol Extending the 
Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 22, 1981,33 U.S.T. 4516; and for 
an additional five years in 1986, see Protocol Extending the Arrangement Regarding 
International Trade in Textiles, BISD, 33d Supp. 7 (1986). During the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, the MFA was extended for 17 months until December 31, 1992, to coincide with 
the expected date for the completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations. When that target date 
was missed, the MFA was extended twice, each time for one year, until December 31, 1994. 
Although the MFA itself expired with the entry into force of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing on January 1, 1995, the bilateral agreements negotiated pursuant to the 
MFA remain in force during the ten-year phaseout of MFA quotas. For other analyses of the 
MFA, see CLINE, supra note 128, at 148-68; VINOD K. AGGARWAL, LffiERAL PROTECTIONISM: 
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF ORGANIZED TEXTILE TRADE (1985); Gary P. Sampson, 
Market Disturbances and the Multifibre Arrangement, in ISSUES IN WORLD TRADE POLICY: 
GATT AT THE CROSSROADS 61 (RH. Snape ed. 1986); Brenda A. Jacobs, Renewal and 
Expansion of the Multifiber Arrangement, 19 L. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 7 (1987); Craig R. Giesse 
& Martin J. Lewin, The Mulitfiber Arrangement: "Temporary" Protection Run Amuck, 19 L. 
& POL'y INT'L Bus. 51 (1987); U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE HISTORY AND CURRENT 
STATUS OF THE MULTIFffiER ARRANGEMENT (USITC Pub. 850 1978); Bhagirath L. Das, The 
GATT Multi-Fiber Arrangement, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 95 (1983); Henry R Zheng, The 
Fourth Multifibre Arrangement and the New Legal Regime for International Trade in Textiles, 
25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301 (1987). For a table describing the similarities and differences 
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among the Short Term Arrangement, the Long Term Arrangement, and MFA I-IV, see Vincent 
Cable, Textiles and Clothing, in WORLD BANK, THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 180, 182 (1. Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski eds. 
1987). 
137. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 64, at 1218. 
138. See id. 
139. See id. at 1219. 
140. See id. 
141. See id at 1218. 
142. See id at 1219. 
143. See Phillip Evans & James Walsh, The EIU Guide to the New GATT 25 (1994). 
144. See Robert C. Cassidy, Jr. & Stuart M. Weiser, Uruguay Round Textiles and Clothing, in THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 223 (Terence P. Stewart ed. 1996); Jennifer 
Hillman, Trade Activities Involving Textiles and Clothing, in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE 
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT 879 (Harvey M. Applebaum & Lyn M. Schlitt eds. 
1995); Sanjoy Bagchi, The Integration of the Textile Trade into GATT, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 31 
(1994); Maarten Smeets, Main Features of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing, and Implications for the Trading System, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 97 (1995); Kitty G. 
Dickerson, Textile Trade: The GATT Exception, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 393 
(1996). 
145. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) art. 1. 
146. Id. art. 2.6. 
147. Id. art. 2.8(a). 
148. Id. art.2.8(b). 
149. Id. art.2.8(c). 
150. Id. art. 9. 
151. It is estimated that the average duty on clothing imports to the United States is 17.5 percent ad 
valorem. See Baffes, supra note 20, at 18. 
152. See ATC, supra note 145, at art. 2.5. 
153. Id. art. 2.13. 
154. Id. art.2.14(a). 
155. Id. art. 2. 14(b). To illustrate this "growth on growth" quota growth rate, if the MFA annual 
quota growth rate was six percent annually, then for Stage 1 the annual quota growth rate was 
6.96 percent (.06 + (.06 x .016». For Stage 2, the annual quota growth rate would be 8.7 
percent (.0696 + (.0696 x .25»; and for Stage 3, the annual quota growth rate would be 11.049 
percent (.087 + (.087 x .27». 
156. Id. art. 4.2. 
157. See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 2004, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex lA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), available at http://www.wto.orglenglish/docs_ellegal_e/25-
safe~e.htm (last visited Sept. 10,2004). 
158. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XI, 61 Stat. A-II. 
159. See WTO DG consults members on possible emergency meeting to discuss textiles and 
clothing adjustment challenges, WTO Press Release/384 (Aug. 4, 2004), available at 
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http://www.wto.orglenglishlnews3/pres04_e/pr384_e.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). 
160. See, e.g., Hildegunn Kyvik Nordas, The Global Textile and Clothing Industry post the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 14 (WTO 2004)("a number of restricted members 
complain that quota increases have not significantly improved market access so far"). 
161. See U.S. Textile Groups Begin Campaign to Extend Textile Quotas in WTO, China Update, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (March 12, 2004); Senate, House Members Support Extension of Textile 
Quotas Past 2004, China Update, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (June 11,2004). 
162. See U.S. In1'l Trade Comm'n, Textiles and Apparel: Assessment of the Competitiveness of 
Certain Foreign Suppliers to the U.S. Market, Inv. No. 332-448 (Pub. 3671 Jan. 2004). The 
World Trade Organization conducted a parallel study which it reported in 2004. See The Global 
Textile and Clothing Industry post the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, supra note 158, at 
34 ("Most analyses of the impact of the phasing out of the ATC conclude that China and India 
will come to dominate world trade in textiles and clothing, with post-ATC market shares for 
China alone estimated at 50 percent or more. This study replicates those predictions ... "). 
163. The 2004 WTO study on the impact of the implementation of the ATC in the EU and the 
combined CanadalUnited States market corroborates the lTC's conclusion: 
Both India and China will almost double their market share [in the EU], and 
China will be the single largest exporter ... while Africa, the United 
States/Canada, Turkey, Central and Eastern European countries and richer 
Asian countries and territories such as Republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei 
will lose market share .... 
Following the elimination of quotas, China increases its market share [of textile 
exports to the United States and Canada] by about 50 percent. The list of the 10 
largest exporters remains the same, but the ranking has changed. We also 
notice that the combined market share of smaller exporters has increased .... 
Other countries losing market shares are African countries that have had 
preferential access to the market before the phasing out of quotas and Latin 
American countries .... 
[In the case of clothing] the impact is much more dramatic. China and India 
combined take 65 percent of the [U.S./Canada] export market - China triples 
its market share while India's market share is quadrupled. All others lose 
market share and the largest losses are incurred by African countries and 
Mexico, whose market shares decline by close to 70 percent. 
Global Textile and Clothing Industry post the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, supra note 
158, at 28, 29, 30. 
164. See ITC TEXTILES AND APPAREL REpORT, supra note 162, at xi. 
165. See id. 
166. See id. 
167. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-06. 
168. See ITC TExTILES AND APPAREL REpORT, supra note 162, at xi. 
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169. See id.; Global Textile and Clothing Industry post the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, 
supra note 158, at 23. 
170. See ITC TEXTILES AND APPAREL REpORT, supra note 162, at xi. 
171. See ITC TEXTILES & APPAREL REpORT, supra note 162, at xii. 
172. Turkey and Colombia also are considered capable suppliers for quick turnaround business. See 
id. 
173. The International Cotton Advisory Committee is an association of 43 governments of cotton 
producing and consuming countries. Its broad-based membership includes Brazil, Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Japan, Mali, and the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Secretariat of the 
Committee publishes information related to world cotton production, supply, demand and 
prices, and provides technical information on cotton production technology. Additional 
information on the Committee is available at http://www.icac.org/icac/general/ 
facts/english.htrnl. 
174. See International Cotton Advisory Committee, Prices Declining, ICAC Press Release, May 3, 
2004, available at http://www .icac.org/icac/cotton_info/publications/PressI2004/pcma y _ 
04.pdf. 
175. See Baffes, supra note 20, at 18. 
176. Pub. L. No. 200, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 Stat. 251 (2000). See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 606, 
106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 323. For an analysis and 
critique of AGOA, see J.M. Migai Akech, The African Growth and Opportunity Act: 
Implications for Kenya's Trade and Development, 33 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & POL. 651, 663-85 
(2001); Rebecca Trent, Implications for Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa 
under the African Growth Opportunity Act, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 213 (2002). 
177. Pub. L. No. 210, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., 116 Stat. 1038 (2002). 
178. Pub. L. No. 274, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., 118 Stat. 823 (2004). 
179. See Pub. L. No. 200, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 Stat. 252, § 103 (2000). 
180. 19 U.S.c. §§ 2461-65. For more on the GSP program, see BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 64, 
at 444-69. 
181. The U.S. International Trade Commission and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative both 
publish an annual report on U.S. trade and investment with sub-Saharan Africa. See, e.g., U.S. 
Int'l Trade Comm'n, U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa, Fourth Annual 
Report, Inv. No. 332-415 (Pub. 3650 Dec. 2003); Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2004 
Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (May 2004). AGOA mandates 
annual reports to Congress through 2008 on U.S. trade and investment policy in Africa and 
implementation of the Act. See 19 U.S.c. § 3705. The U.S. Government maintains a website 
on the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), available at www.agoa.gov. 
182. See 19 U.S.c. § 2466a(b)(1). The 48 eligible countries are listed in 19 u.s.c. § 3706. 
183. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade and Development, Generalized System of 
Preferences, Notification by the United States, WT/COMTD/N/1/Add.3 (March 1,2001). 
184. See H.R. Rep. No. 501, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 758. 
185. See id.; World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade and Development, Generalized System 
of Preferences, Notification by the United States, WT/COMTD/N/1/Add.3 (March 1,2001). 
186. See 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(2)(A), (D). 
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187. The eligible countries are Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Republic 
of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zambia. See Presidential Proclamation See also White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Statement by the Deputy Press Secretary (Dec. 30, 2003). In 2003 the President removed the 
Central African Republic and Eritrea from the list of eligible countries. AGOA requires the 
President to determine annually whether sub-Saharan African countries are, or remain, eligible 
for benefits based on their progress in meeting criteria set out in the Act. These criteria include 
establishment of a market-based economy, the rule of law, the elimination of barriers to U.S. 
trade and investment, implementation of economic policies to reduce poverty, the protection of 
internationally recognized worker rights, and establishment of a system to combat corruption. 
Additionally, countries cannot engage in: i) violations of internationally recognized human 
rights, ii) support for acts of international terrorism, or iii) activities that undermine U.S. 
national security or foreign policy interests. See 19 U.S.C. § 3703.The other 11 SSA countries 
that are currently not designated as AGO A beneficiary countries are Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, 
and Zimbabwe. 
188. See Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 210, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., § 3108, 116 Stat. 1038 (2002). 
189. See 19 U.S.c. §§ 2466b, 3721(b)(3)(A)(i). 
190. See 19 U.S.c. § 3721(b)(3)(B)(i). 
191. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Int'! Trade Admin., U.S.-African Trade Profile 3 (April 2004). 
192. See id. 
193. See U.S. Department of Commerce, National Trade Data, available at 
http://ese.export.gov/SCRIPTS/hsrun.exe/DistributedlITA2003_N A TION AL/StateIdlCQ379lbI 
iDuXY9XDcugMTOlrZn33G-48JRlHAHTpageIHS_Page4Chart. 
194. See id. 
195. See U.S.-African Trade Profile, supra note 191, at 1-2. 
196. See U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa, supra note 181, at 6-14, 6-79. 
197. See id. at 1-2, 111. 
198. See World Trade Organization, Background Statistical Sheet with Respect to Trade in Textiles 
and Clothing, G1L/692, 77-80 (Sept. 20, 2004). The World Trade Organization has rank 
ordered countries that export clothing to the United States and to other countries. In 2003, the 
top three clothing exporters to the United States were China, Mexico, and Hong Kong, in that 
order. The following table lists the top 12 SSA countries that exported clothing to the United 
States in 2003, their overall rank in terms of share of total U.S. clothing imports, and their 
percentage share of total U.S. clothing imports: 
Country Rank Percent Share 
Lesotho 27 .59 
Mauritius 31 .40 
South Africa 35 .35 
Madagascar 39 .30 
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Kenya 40 .28 
Swaziland 45 .21 
Namibia 57 .06 
Malawi 64 .03 
Botswana 79 .01 
Zimbabwe 83 .01 
Ghana 84 .01 
See id. Fifteen other SSA countries (Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Cameroon, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Togo, Guinea, Gambia, Burkina Faso, 
and Niger) exported very small amounts of clothing to the United States in 2003, with 
individual percentage shares of such imports being less than .01 percent. See id. South Africa is 
the only SSA nation that exported more than a de minimis amount of textiles to the United 
States in 2003. It ranked 26th overall, with a .20 percent share of total U.S. textile imports. See 
id. at 27-3l. 
199. The rule of origin for non-textile and clothing imports is 35-percent SSA value. In addition, 15 
percent of the value of the imported product can be attributed to inputs originating in the 
United. The AGOA rule of origin provides: 
The duty-free treatment provided under paragraph (1) shall apply to any article 
described in that paragraph that meets the requirements of [19 U.S.c.] section 
2463(a)(2) of this title, except that--
(A) if the cost or value of materials produced in the customs territory of the 
United States is included with respect to that article, an amount not to exceed 
15 percent of the appraised value of the article at the time it is entered that is 
attributed to such United States cost or value may be applied toward 
determining the percentage referred to in subparagraph (A) of [19 U.S.C.] 
section 2463(a)(2) of this title; and 
(B) the cost or value of the materials included with respect to that article that 
are produced in one or more beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries or 
former beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries shall be applied in 
determining such percentage. 
19 U.S.c. § 2466a(b)(2) (2004). 
200. It is estimated that the average duty on clothing imports to the United States is 17.5 percent ad 
valorem. See Baffes, supra note 20, at 18. However, U.S. duty rates on imported clothing 
made of cotton tend to be one-half or less than the duty rates for clothing made of man-made 
fibers. For example, the duty rate for a women's cotton blazer is 9.4 percent ad valorem. See 
HTS 6204.32.20. That same item made of artificial fibers carries a duty rate of 27.3 percent ad 
valorem. See HTS 6204.39.30. The duty rate for a women's cotton dress is 8.4 percent ad 
valorem. See HTS 6204.42.30. That same item made of artificial fibers carries a duty rate of 16 
percent ad valorem. See HTS 6204.44.40. 
201. See 2004 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, supra note 181, at 123, 
374 
HeinOnline -- 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 375 2004-2005
Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade, and Development Policy 
Annex A.The 24 countries eligible for textile and clothing benefits are Benin, Botswana, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. In order to qualify for the textile and clothing 
benefits, beneficiary countries must first establish that they have effective visa systems to 
prevent illegal transshipment and use of counterfeit documentation and that they have instituted 
required enforcement and verification procedures. See 19 U.S.c. § 3722 (2004). 
202. See 19 U.S.c. § 3721(b) (2004). 
203. There are four steps involved in processing natural fibers and making them into a finished item. 
First, the fiber is harvested. Second, the fiber is spun into yarn. Third, the yarn is woven or knit 
into fabric. Fourth, the fabric is cut and sewn into clothing (e.g., shirts and blouses) and other 
made-up textile articles (e.g., bedsheets and towels). See ITC TEXTILE & APPAREL REPORT, 
supra note 162, at 1-2. 
204. See H.R. REp. No. 108-501, supra note 184, at 9. 
205. See 2004 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, supra note 181, at 5-6. 
206. See id. at 5. 
207. The AGOA III limitations of benefits provision provides: 
(i) In general 
Preferential treatment under this paragraph shall be extended in the I-year 
period beginning October 1, 2003, and in each of the 11 succeeding I-year 
periods, to imports of clothing articles in an amount not to exceed the 
applicable percentage of the aggregate square meter equivalents of all clothing 
articles imported into the United States in the preceding 12-month period for 
which data are available. 
(ii) Applicable percentage 
For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "applicable percentage" rneans--
(I) 4.747 percent for the I-year period beginning October 1, 2003, 
increased in each of the 5 succeeding I-year periods by equal increments, 
so that for the I-year period beginning October 1, 2007, the applicable 
percentage does not exceed 7 percent; and 
(II) for each succeeding I-year period until September 30, 2015, not to 
exceed 7 percent. 
19 U.S.c. § 3721(b)(3)(A) (2004). 
208. AGOA defines the term "lesser developed beneficiary sub-Saharan African country" as 
(I) a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country that had a per capita gross 
national product of less than $1,500 in 1998, as measured by the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development; 
(II) Botswana; and 
(III) N arnibia. 
[d. § 3721 (b)(3)(B)(iii)(I)-(III). 
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209. AGOA III provides the following "Special Rule" for lesser-developed SSA countries: 
(i) In general 
Preferential treatment under this paragraph shall be extended though September 
30, 2007, for clothing articles wholly assembled, or knit-to-shape and wholly 
assembled, or both, in one or more lesser developed beneficiary sub-Saharan 
African countries, regardless of the country of origin of the fabric or the yam 
used to make such articles, in an amount not to exceed the applicable 
percentage of the aggregate square meter equivalents of all clothing articles 
imported into the United States in the preceding 12-month period for which 
data are available. 
Id. § 3721(b)(3)(B)(i). 
210. See 2004 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, supra note 181, at 5. 
211. AGOA provides that "the term 'lesser developed beneficiary sub-Saharan African country' 
means a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country that had a per capita gross national product of 
less than $1,500 a year in 1998, as measured by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development." 19 U.S.C. § 3721(b)(3)(B)(iii)(I)-(III) (2004). 
212. The AGOA III Special Rule percentages are as follows: 
(I) 2.3571 percent for the I-year period beginning October 1,2003; 
(II) 2.6428 percent for the I-year period beginning October 1, 2004; 
(III) 2.9285 percent for the I-year period beginning October 1, 2005; and 
(IV) 1.6071 percent for the I-year period beginning October 1,2006. 
/d. § 3721(b)(3)(B)(ii)(I)-(IV). 
213. See H.R. REp. No. 108-501, supra note 184" at 10. 
214. Under the Act, the President is authorized to proclaim duty-free and quota-free benefits for 
clothing that is both cut (or knit-to-shape) and sewn or otherwise assembled in beneficiary 
countries from fabric or yams not formed in the United States or a beneficiary country, if the 
President has determined that such yams or fabrics cannot be supplied by the domestic industry 
in commercial quantities in a timely manner and has extended such treatment. The Committee 
for the Implementation of Textile Agreements (CIT A) has the authority to implement certain 
provisions of the Act's textile and clothing benefits. See 19 U.S.c. § 3721(b)(3)(C) (2004). 
These provisions include the determination of the annual cap on imports of clothing that is 
assembled in beneficiary countries from fabric formed in beneficiary countries from yam 
originating either in the United States or in beneficiary countries. In Executive Order 13191, 
the President delegated to CIT A authority to determine whether yam or fabric cannot be 
supplied by the domestic industry in commercial quantities in a timely manner and to extend 
preferential treatment to clothing articles from such yam or fabric. See Exec. Order No. 13,191, 
66 Fed. Reg. 7,271 (Jan. 17,2001). As of April 2004, seven commercial availability petitions 
had been approved, five denied, and two were under consideration. The types of products that 
receive duty-free treatment under AGOA are available at http://otexa.ita.doc.gov. CITA also is 
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authorized to impose a "tariff snapback" in the event that a surge in imports of eligible articles 
causes serious damage or threat thereof to domestic industry. As of mid-2004, there were no 
requests for such relief. See H.R. REp. No. 108-501,supra note 184, at 10. CITA also is 
authorized to determine whether exporters have engaged in illegal transshipment and to deny 
benefits to such exporters for a period of five years. See Exec. Order No. 13,191, supra this 
note; 19 U.S.c. § 3721(b)(3)(C) (2004). 
215. See U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa, Fourth Annual Report, supra note 
181, at 2-3. 
216. A bill was passed in the House in October 2004 that would grant Mauritius a one-year 
designation as a lesser-developed country for purposes of AGOA's third-country fabric 
provision. See House Passes Miscellaneous Tariff Bill With Prospective Repeal of 1916 AD 
Act, Inside U.S. Trade (Oct. 9, 2004). As of December 2003, the textile and clothing trade 
benefits were available to the 37 countries that the President designated as AGOA beneficiary 
countries, provided that these countries satisfy certain customs-related requirements, including 
adoption of procedures to prevent unlawful transshipments and the use of counterfeit 
documents. As of December 2003, 20 countries had met these requirements: Angola, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Namibia, Zambia, Tanzania, Cameroon, Mozambique, Ghana, Senegal, 
and Cape Verde. See U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa, supra note 181, at 
5-34. 
217. AGOA III added ethnic printed fabrics to Category 9. See 19 U.S.C. § 3721(b)(6)(B) (2004). 
218. See 2004 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, supra note 181, at 6. 
219. See id. 
220. See 19 U.S.C. § 3702(8) (2004). 
221. See 2004 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, supra note 181, at 59-
60. 
222. See 19 U.S.c. § 3735(b)(I)-(2) (2004). 
223. See id. § 3735(c). 
224. See id. § 3740. 
225. See id. § 3737(b)(3). For other U.S. AID actIVItIes in sub-Saharan Africa, see 2004 
Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Implementation ofthe African Growth and Opportunity Act, supra note 181, at 37-40. 
226. See 2004 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, supra note 181, at 56-
58. 
227. See 19 U.S.C. § 3723 (2004). 
228. See 2004 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, supra note 181, at 61. 
The parties intend to conclude negotiations by December 2004. See Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, Free Trade with Southern Africa: Building on the Success of AGOA (June 30, 
2003), available at http://www.ustr.govlDocumenCLibrarylFaccSheets/2003IFree_Trade_ 
with_Southern_Africa_Buildin~on_the_Success_oCAGOA.htrn1. 
229. See 19 U.S.C. § 3724 (2004). 
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230. See id. § 3731. 
231. See INT'L MONETARY FuND & INT'L DEVELOPMENT ASS'N, HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR 
COUNTRIES (HIPC) INrfIATIVE -- STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION (Sept. 2003), available at 
http://www.imf.orglexternaUnplhipc12003/status/091203.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2004); 
UNCT AD LDC REPORT 2004, supra note 12, at 19. 
232. See id. 
233. See Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative -- Status of Implementation, supra note 
231, at 8. 
234. See Eric 1. Boos, Between Scylla and Charybdis: . The Changing Nature of u.s. and EU 
Development Policy and Its Effects on the Least Developed Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
11 TUL. 1. INT'L & COMPo L. 181,211 (2003). 
235. 19 U.S.C. § 3732 (2004). 
236. See id. § 3733(b)(3H4). OPIC is currently providing $1.2 billion in financing and political risk 
insurance to 42 projects in the region. See 2004 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and 
Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act, supra note 181, at 50-51. 
237. See 19 U.S.c. § 3734(a). The Ex-1m Bank can finance the purchase by SSA buyers of U.S. 
textile manufacturing equipment; U.S. fabric, yarn, and thread for production of clothing; and 
U.S. raw materials for the production of non-textile and clothing goods. In FY 2003 the Ex-1m 
Bank supported 152 transactions in 20 SSA countries for $643 million. See 2004 
Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, supra note 181, at 52-53. 
238. See U.S.-African Trade Profile, supra note 191, at 6-7. 
239. See 19 U~S.c. § 3738 (2004). 
240. See id. § 3739. In 2003 President Bush announced a five-year, $15 billion initiative for AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria relief, the bulk of which is directed to the hardest hit countries of sub-
Saharan Africa. See 2004 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, supra 
note 181, at 48-49. 
241. See Canada Moves Forward with Compulsory Licensing Drugs Bill, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (May 
7,2004). 
242. WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, adopted Nov. 14,2001, WTIMIN(01)/DEC/2, para. 5 (Nov. 21,2001). 
243. WTO General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, Decision of 30 August 2003, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003). 
244. 19 U.S.c. § 3741(b)(1)-(4) (2004). 
245. See 2004 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, supra note 181, at 42-
47. 
246. See S. REp. No. 108-55 (2003). 
247. See G.A. Res. 2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/2 (Sept. 18,2000). 
248. See id. 
249. See Millennium Challenge Account Is Launched, Fact Sheet (Feb. 3, 2004), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004128848.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). Future budgets 
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are expected to increase to $5 billion starting in fiscal year 2006. See H.R. REp. No. 108-205, at 
35 (2003)(''The bill would authorize the appropriation of $1.3 billion in 2004, $3 billion in 
2005, and $5 billion in 2006 to fund the corporation."); The Millennium Challenge Account, 
available at http://www.mca.gov/aboucus/overview/index.shtrnl (last visited Sept. 23, 2004). 
The United States spends approximately $14 billion annually in foreign development 
assistance. See Nancy Birdsall, Isaac Shapiro & Brian Deese, How Significant are the 
Administration's Proposed Increases in Foreign Development Aid? 9, Table 3 (Center for 
Global Development/Center on Budget and Policy Priorities May 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/docs/CGD-CBPP_aid_analysis.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). 
250. See 22 U.S.C. § 7705(a). The Board of Directors of the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
identified 70 candidate countries as eligible to compete for funding for FY 2005. See 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, Report on Countries That Are Candidates for Millennium 
Challenge Account Eligibility in FY 2005 and Countries That Would be Candidates But For 
Legal Prohibitions (2004), available at http://www.mca.gov/countries/candidate/ 
FY053andidate_report.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). Of those 70 countries, 33 are sub-
Saharan African nations, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali. 
251. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 7705, 7709(a) (2004). 
252. See id. §§ 7706, 7709(b). The Act provides the following criteria for a candidate country to be 
selected as an eligible country: 
(b) CRITERIA.--A candidate country should be considered to be an eligible 
country for purposes of this section if the Board determines that the country has 
demonstrated a commitment to--
(1) just and democratic governance, including a demonstrated 
commitment to--promote political pluralism, equality, and the rule of 
law; respect human and civil rights, including the rights of people with 
disabilities; protect private property rights; encourage transparency and 
accountability of government; and combat corruption; economic 
freedom, including a demonstrated commitment to economic policies 
that-
Id. at § 7706(b). 
A) encourage citizens and firms to participate in global trade and 
international capital markets; 
(B) promote private sector growth and the sustainable 
management of natural resources; 
(C) strengthen market forces in the economy; and 
(D) respect worker rights, including the right to form labor 
unions; and investments in the people of such country, 
particularly women and children, including programs that-
(A) promote broad-based primary education; and 
(B) strengthen and build capacity to provide quality 
public health and reduce child mortality. 
253. See id. at §§ 7706(c), 7707, 7709(d). 
254. The elements of an MCA Compact are set forth in Section 609(b) of the Act: 
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(b) ELEMENTS.-
IN GENERAL.--The Compact should take into account the national 
development strategy of the eligible country and shall contain-
(A) the specific objectives that the country and the United States expect to 
achieve during the term of the Compact; 
(B) the responsibilities of the country and the United States in the 
achievement of such objectives; 
(C) regular benchmarks to measure, where appropriate, progress toward 
achieving such objectives; 
(D) an identification of the intended beneficiaries, disaggregated by 
income level, gender, and age, to the maximum extent practicable; 
(E) a multi-year financial plan, including the estimated amount of 
contributions by the Corporation and the country and proposed 
mechanisms to implement the plan and provide oversight, that describes 
how the requirements of subparagraphs (A) through (D) will be met, 
including identifying the role of civil society in the achievement of such 
requirements; 
(F) where appropriate, a description of the current and potential 
participation of other donors in the achievement of such objectives; 
(G) a plan to ensure appropriate fiscal accountability for the use of 
assistance provided under section 605; 
(H) where appropriate, a process or processes for consideration of 
solicited proposals under the Compact as well as a process for 
consideration of unsolicited proposals by the Corporation and national, 
regional, or local units of government; 
(I) a requirement that open, fair, and competitive procedures are used in a 
transparent manner in the administration of grants or cooperative 
agreements or the procurement of goods and services for the 
accomplishment of objectives under the Compact; 
(J) the strategy of the eligible country to sustain progress made toward 
achieving such objectives after expiration of the Compact; and 
(K) a description of the role of the United States Agency for International 
Development in any design, implementation, and monitoring of programs 
and activities funded under the Compact. 
Id. § 7708(b). The duration of a Compact is not to exceed 5 years. See id. § 7708(j). 
255. See S. REp. No. 108-55, supra note 246, at 6. 
256. See 22 U.S.C. § 7704(b)-(c) (2004). 
257. See Millennium Challenge Account Is Launched, Fact Sheet (Feb. 3, 2004), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/psI2004/28848.htm (last visited Sept. 20,2004). 
258. See Millennium Challenge Corp., Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the 
Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance in FY 2004 
(2004), available at http://www.mca.gov/countries/selectionlmethodology_report.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2004); Millennium Challenge Corp., Report on the Criteria and Methodology 
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for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account 
Assistance in FY 2005, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,090 (Aug. 31, 2004). The following table lists the 
criteria used by the MCC Board when making its eligibility detennination: 
Ruling Justly Encouraging Economic Investing in People 
Freedom 
1. Civil Liberties 1. Country Credit Rating 1. Public Expenditures on 
2. Political Rights 2. I-year Consumer Price Health as Percent of 
3. Voice and Accountability Inflation GDP 
4. Government 3. Fiscal Policy 2. Immunization Rates: DPT3 
Effectiveness 4. Trade Policy and Measles 
5. Rule of Law 5. Regulatory Quality 3. Public Primary Education 6. Control of Corruption 6. Days to Start a Business Spending as Percent of 
GDP 
4. Primary Education 
Completion Rate 
See Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Detennining the Eligibility of Candidate 
Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance in FY 2004, supra this note, at 2. 
259. See Report on Countries That Are Candidates for Millennium Challenge Account Eligibility in 
FY 2005, supra note 250. 
260. See Millennium Challenge Corp., Report on the Selection of MCA Eligible Countries for FY 
2004 (May 6, 2004), available at http://www.mca.gov/countries/eligiblelReport_Selection_ 
FY04.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). 
261. For a critique of the eligible-country selection process, see Sarah Lucas & Steve Radelet, An 
MCA Scorecard: Who Qualified, Who Did Not, and the MCC Board's Use of Discretion 
(Center for Global Development May 2004), available at http://www.cgdev.orgl 
docs/MCAScorecard_0528.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). 
262. An eligible country may enter into and have in effect only one Compact at any given time. An 
eligible country may enter into one or more subsequent Compacts after the expiration of an 
existing Compact. See 22 U.S.c. § 7708(k) (2004). 
263. See Birdsall, Shapiro & Deese, supra note 250, at 4. The Bush Administration has been unable 
to fully fund the MCA. See Clean Slate, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2004, at 73. See also 
Foreign Aid with a Carrot, CHRIS. SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 27, 2004, at 8. ("No [MCA] funds have 
been released .... For the '05 budget just passed by lawmakers, the administration asked for 
$2.5 billion, and got about half of that. "). 
264. See ITC TEXTILES & APPAREL REPORT, supra note 162, at K-3. 
265. See id. 
266. See id. 
267. See id. 
268. [d. 
269. [d. Its principal markets include the European Union, the United States, and other Mrican 
countries. Other countries with textile capacity include Madagascar, which has a fully 
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integrated supply chain for producing trousers from heavyweight fabrics, and Zambia, which 
exports cotton yarn to other SSA countries. See id. 
270. [d. 
271. [d. 
272. See id. 
273. /d. at K-4. Data presented in this appendix on U.S. imports of textiles and clothing from SSA 
countries are official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce (the data are available on 
the website of its Office of Textiles and Clothing (OTEXA), available at http:// 
otexa.ita.doc.gov/catss.htm). 
274. See id. at K-4. 
27S. See id. at K-3. 
276. See id. 
277. See id .at K-4. 
278. See id. 
279. See id. at K-3. 
280. The South African textile sector is protected by duties ranging from 7.S percent to 30 percent 
ad valorem. A major concern expressed by this industry is that South African tariffs of 22 
percent on cotton textiles would not be adequate to protect the sector from a surge in Chinese 
exports following the phaseout of ATC quotas in 200S. See ITC TEXTILE & APPAREL REpORT, 
supra note 162, at K-3, K-4. 
281. See id. at K-4. 
282. See id. 
283. See id. at K-S. 
284. See id. 
28S. See id. The remaining AGOA clothing imports consisted of knit-to-shape clothing and clothing 
of fabrics not available in commercial quantities in the United States. 
286. See id. at K-S. 
287. [d. at 2-11. 
288. [d. 
289. See id. at 2-12. 
290. [d. at 2-12. 
291. [d. 
292. Id. 
293. See id. at 2-12. 
294. See id. at 3-39. 
29S. Id. 
296. Id. 
297. [d. 
298. [d. 
299. [d. 
300. [d. 
301. [d. 
302. [d. at 3-40. 
303. [d. 
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304. Id. 
305. Id. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. 
308. See id. Specifically, one buyer in Mauritius noted that it can take 43 days to ship clothing to the 
U.S. market. See id. 
309. See id. Shipping is shorter in terms of time, and more frequent in occurrence, from southern 
Africa (about 21-30 days). See id. at 3-41. 
310. See id. at 3-41. 
311. See id. Other logistical problems also confront SSA. For example, one integrated 
manufacturing firm indicated that the entire cost base in Mauritius is high; buildings, 
electricity, fabrics, and labor are cheaper in China. The same firm noted that although wages 
were cheaper in Madagascar, other costs were more expensive, including electricity and 
transportation. In Lesotho, utility costs, including water and electricity, are higher than in 
competitor countries, and outages occur. One company operating in Mozambique indicated that 
operating a textile factory in that country would be extremely difficult owing to a lack of 
electricity and constant outages. See id. 
312. See id. at 3-43. 
313. See id. at 3-41 to 3-42. 
314. See id. at 3-42. 
315. Id. 
316. Id. 
317. See id. For example, one company estimated that the cost of a standard cotton chino fabric 
imported into Lesotho from China was 58 cents per square yard, compared with $1.57 per 
square yard for an identical fabric produced in South Africa. Some of this cost differential may 
be due to the appreciation of the rand against the U.S. dollar in 2002. See id. 
318. See id. 
319. See id. In particular, SSA has a deficit in the production of knitwear fabric. Mauritius, an 
important SSA fabric producer, has a deficit in the production of cotton yarn for knitwear, and 
Lesotho, a major exporter of knit shirts, does not produce yarn or fabric. Both countries have 
planned investments coming on line in the future, but these industries will take time to get into 
full-time operation. See id. 
320. See id. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. 
323. See id. The volume disadvantage was cited in particular in the context of the U.S. market, as 
the EU market generally demands smaller quantities on a flow basis. See id. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. at 3-43. 
326. Id. 
327. /d. 
328. /d. 
329. Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, Mauritius, and South Africa accounted for 87 percent of total SSA 
textile and clothing exports in 2001. See U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa, 
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supra note 181, at 5-32. 
330. See ITC TEXTILE & APPAREL REpORT, supra note 162, at 3-20. 
331. Boos, supra note 234, at 207. 
332. Major SSA cotton exporters include Guinea Bissau, Malawi, and the West and Central African 
nations of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Togo. See UNCT AD LDC REpORT 2004, 
supra note 12, at 117 (''The ratio of agricultural exports to agricultural value-added is certainly 
not a perfect measure of the extent to which agricultural livelihoods are export-oriented. But it 
suggests that the direct involvement of people working in agricultural activities in LDCs in 
exports is rather limited, with a few notable exceptions, including Guinea-Bissau, Malawi and 
the West African WCs which export cotton." [emphasis added]). Supplementary export data is 
available at the U.S. Department of State's website, http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/ (last visited 
July 13, 2004). In one month alone (March 2004), U.S. cotton exports totaled nearly $656 
million, more than quadruple Mali's annual cotton exports by value in 2002. See U.S. Dep't of 
AgriCUlture, Foreign Agricultural Service, available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/ 
2004/07/master2.htm#Worldpercent20Cottonpercent200utlook (last visited July 22, 2004). 
China and Turkey are the largest markets for U.S. cotton exports. See id. 
333. See 2004 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, supra note 181, at 16-
17. 
334. /d. 
335. Id. 
336. Id. 
337. Id. 
338. Id. 
339. Id. 
340. Id. 
341. Id. 
342. Id. 
343. Id. 
344. Id. 
345. See U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa, supra note 181, at 2-11 to 2-13. 
346. See id. at 2-19 to 2-22. The ITC also reports on export diversification into other agricultural 
products, motor vehicles and parts, and information technology products, although this 
expansion has been limited primarily to South Mrica, Kenya, and Uganda. See id. 
347. Certain endogenous factors (mostly state-owned monopsonies and monopolies) are at work that 
hurt the productivity and lower the income of WCA cotton producers. See Baffes, supra note 
20, at 14-20. Reforms in this area have been undertaken or are underway. See id. at 25-28. See 
generally Takarnasa Akiyama, John Baffes, Donald F. Larson & Panos Varangis, Commodity 
Market Reform in Africa: Some Recent Experience (World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 2995, March 2003). 
348. See Baffes, supra note 20, at 22. 
349. See id.at 22-23. 
350. Baffes, supra note 20, at 26; see supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
351. Baffes, supra note 20, at 26. 
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352. Id. 
353. See generally Baffes, supra note 20, at 26. 
354. Id. at 27-28. 
355. See id. 
356. Id at 28. 
357. See id. As noted in the WTO's Trade Policy Review conducted for Benin in 2004: 
The timid progress made and the currently limited opportunities for 
diversification (towards cassava and yams) mean that the cotton subsector 
remains the dominant activity, providing the majority of export earnings, which 
explains Benin's position and sense of urgency during the Doha negotiating 
round. The wide-ranging reforms implemented in the cotton subsector have, 
inter alia, led to the liberalization of the marketing of seed cotton and cotton 
ginning, as well as the abolition of the practice of fixing the producer price for 
cotton (up to the 2001-2002 season) and preparations for privatizing the State 
enterprise SONAPRA. 
WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review, Benin, WTrrPRlS/131 at 56 (May 24,2004). 
358. As noted in the WTO's Trade Policy Review conducted for Burkina Faso in 2004: 
The State has continued to reform the cotton subsector, the cornerstone of the 
rural economy. The Textile Fibres Company (SOFlTEX), in which the State 
has become a minority shareholder, remains the leading operator in the 
subsector because of its de facto monopoly on the collection of seed cotton in 
the cotton-growing areas of the west and south-west. Since the first review, the 
objective of reform in the subsector has been to give producers a more 
important role in managing the subsector (with the State taking on a secondary 
role), to raise their incomes, and to establish a fund to provide support during 
periods when the selling price of cotton fibre on global markets does not cover 
production costs. The level of prices guaranteed to producers prior to the 
season depends on previous trends in global prices and the performance of 
SOFITEX. Another aim of the reform is to open up new cotton-growing areas 
in the centre and the east to allow the entry of new operators able to provide 
cotton producers with support, as SOFlTEX did in the past. In the long term, 
the latter should be privatized. 
WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review, Burkina Faso, WTrrPRlS/132 at 52 (May 24,2004). 
359. As noted in the WTO's Trade Policy Review conducted for Mali in 2004: 
Cotton production is still the cornerstone of trade in agricultural products, as 
well as of the manufacturing sector, and giving impetus to this activity plays a 
central role in alleviating poverty. The cotton subsector is still dominated by 
the Mali Textile Development Company (CMDT), in which the State is the 
largest shareholder. The CMDT has a legal monopoly on the ginning and 
marketing of cotton fibre in the cotton-growing area attributed to it. The 
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objective of the ongoing reform in this subsector is the emergence of new 
operators and privatization of the CMDT in 2006. A new formula for 
determining producer prices that takes into account, inter alia, the global price 
for cotton was put into effect during the 2003-2004 season and the minimum 
price was raised in order to increase producers' incomes. 
WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review, Burkina Faso, WTffPRlS/133 at 50 (May 24,2004). 
360. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade and Development, Participation of the 
Developing Countries in the Global Trading System, WT/COMTDlWllOO, Annex Chart 2, at 
14 (June 19,2002). 
361. Economic Development in Africa: Trade Performance and Commodity Dependence, supra 
note 59, at 1-2. 
362. See id. at 2-3. 
363. See id. at 8 (citations omitted). 
364. See id. at 58-59. 
365. See id. The provision of subsidies is also working at cross-purposes with efforts to provide debt 
relief to countries in the region. In this connection the following UNCT AD observation is 
particularly salient: 
The World Bank estimates that in 2002 the world market price of cotton would 
have been more than 25 percent higher but for the direct support of the United 
States for its cotton producers. Furthermore, various estimates suggest that in 
2002 cotton subsidies by the United States and the EU caused a loss of up to 
$300 million in revenue to Africa as a whole, which is more than the total debt 
relief ($230 million) approved by the World Bank and the IMF under the 
enhanced HIPC Initiative to nine cotton-exporting HIPCs in West and Central 
Africa in the same year. The cost of lower cotton prices to Mali, according to 
Oxfam, amounted to $43 million in 2001. This is exactly the amount of debt 
relief Mali received from the World Bank and the IMF in the same year under 
the enhanced HIPC Initiative. In Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali, about 11 
million people depend on cotton as their only source of income, and in Benin, 
for example; lower cotton prices have been associated with a 4 percent rise in 
poverty in 2001. 
Id. at 25-26 (footnotes omitted). 
366. See Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, supra note 3, Annex A, para. 
17 ("Members agree to establish detailed modalities ensuring the parallel elimination of all 
forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect by a 
credible end date."). 
367. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 64, at 434-35, 800-05 (stating that LDCs are exempted 
from the SCM Agreement's prohibition on export subsidies); See id. at 434. 
368. Direct payments received by cotton farmers under the 2002 Farm Act, although claimed to be 
exempt green box subsidies, were found by a WTO panel to be amber box subsidies because 
such payments did not satisfy the Annex 2, para. 6(b) criterion that decoupled farm support not 
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be conditioned on the type or volume of production. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
369. Annex 2, paragraph 6, of the Agreement on Agriculture on decoupled farm support provides: 
6. Decoupled income support 
(a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by clearly-defined 
criteria such as income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use or 
production level in a defined and fixed base period. 
(b) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or 
based on, the type or volume of production (including livestock units) 
undertaken by the producer in any year after the base period. 
(c) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or 
based on, the prices, domestic or international, applying to any production 
undertaken in any year after the base period. 
(d) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or 
based on, the factors of production employed in any year after the base period. 
(e) No production shall be required in order to receive such payments. 
370. See Baffes, supra note 20, at 32. 
371. See UNCT AD LDC REPORT 2004, supra note 12, at 228. 
372. See id. 
373. See id. 
374. The 2004 framework agreement on agriculture concluded by the WTO members identifies a 
category of "special products" for which special border measures could be imposed. However, 
such defensive measures are of little help to SSA countries hurt by the offensive use of 
domestic and export subsidies in developed countries that depress the price of cotton on world 
markets. The concept of "special product" could thus be expanded in recognition of the fact 
that for many LDCs, exports of commodity crops such as cotton are critical to their economic 
survival. 
375. Given the existence of substitutes as well as equivalent products, such partial elimination of 
support should be considered a second-best solution to a more comprehensive approach. See 
UNCTAD LDC REpORT 2004, supra note 12, at 228. If this approach were adopted with the 
LDCs as the target group, product ranking would be of importance. The key strategic products, 
depending on the method of identification, would include, in alphabetical order, beans, beef 
and veal, cotton, garlic, maize, milk, onions, potatoes, rice, sheepmeat, sorghum, sugar and 
wheat. See id. 
376. See Boos, supra note 234, at 216. 
377. Economic Development in Africa: Trade Performance and Commodity Dependence, supra 
note 59, at 54. 
378. See Boos, supra note 234, at 216. 
379. See U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa, supra note 181, at 3-1. 
380. Id. 
381. For an analysis of the nine SSA regional trade arrangements, see id. at 3-3 to 3-21. 
382. UNCTAD LDC REpORT 2004, supra note 12, at 257. 
383. /d. 
387 
HeinOnline -- 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 388 2004-2005
Kennedy 
384. [d. 
385. See supra notes 205-217 and accompanying text. 
386. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries, WTIDS246/ABIR (April 7, 2004). As interpreted by the 
Appellate Body, the Enabling Clause does not prohibit granting different tariff treatment to 
products originating in different GSP beneficiary countries, provided that such differential 
treatment does not treat similarly circumstanced developing countries in a dissimilar manner. ). 
Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries, WTIDS246/ABIR, para. 173-176 (April 7, 2004). Given 
that AGOA beneficiaries include a mix of both LDCs and developing countries, if an LDC or a 
developing country from outside the region were to complain, the United States might be hard 
pressed to successfully defend AGOA. Thus, as a regional trade preference program, AGOA 
itself may be unlawful under the Enabling Clause. See Decision of November 18, 1979 on 
Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries, BISD, 26th Supp. 203 (1979). Moreover, AGOA has not received a WTO waiver 
from GATT obligations as have the other U.S. regional trade preference programs. See, e.g., 
Decision of the WTO General Council of Nov. 15, 1995, WTILII04 (granting the United States 
a waiver for the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act). See also Zoellick Says WTO 
Decision on EU Preferences Puts AGOA at Risk, Inside U.S. Trade (Dec. 12,2003). 
387. Decision of November 18, 1979 on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, supra note 
386. 
388. See Joint Proposal, supra note 9, at 3, para. 16 ("Support given to the cotton sector by the 
United States, China and the European Union was estimated at US$ 6 billion in 2001102, which 
corresponds in value terms to all global exports during that year [footnote omitted]."). 
389. See Cotton Sector Strategies in West and Central Africa, supra note 29, at 13. 
390. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, April 15, 1994, art. 7.8, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 331.L.M. 81 (1994). 
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